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The "other-race" effect refers to the common observation that individuals are 
better at remembering faces of their own race than faces of another race. The 
relevance of the "other-race" effect to social interaction between people of different 
races and eyewitness identification of criminal suspects has spurred much research 
into uncovering the nature of the asymmetry between recognition of own- and other-
race faces. So far, however, many attempts to consistently demonstrate factors that 
contribute to the "other-race" effect have failed. One of the factors that may play a 
role in the "other-race" effect, but has yet to be shown to do so empirically, is racial 
attitudes. Past research attempting to link racial attitudes to cross-race face 
recognition has mainly used explicit measures of racial attitudes. The goal of the 
current study was to find out if explicit racial attitudes, implicit racial attitudes, and a 
personal social outlook of "inclusiveness" relate to the "other-race" effect. White 
participants completed explicit attitudes measures, a measure of "inclusiveness," the 
Bona Fide Pipeline procedure (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), and a 
short priming task designed to assess racial attitudes. Explicit racial attitudes were 
found to relate to the "other-race" effect in a nonlinear manner. Implicit racial 
attitudes measured by the Bona Fide pipeline did not relate to the "other-race" effect, 
but implicit racial attitudes measured by the short priming task related to cross-race 
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face recognition in a linear manner. Scores from the measure of "inclusiveness" as a 
social outlook did not relate to the "other-race" effect. Implications for research on 
the "other-race" effect and the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure are discussed. 
OVERVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH AND CURRENT PROJECT 
Introduction 
The ability to recognize the face of another person is central to almost all of 
our social interactions. Beyond mere social interaction, face recognition has proved 
to be an essential element in police lineups, providing personal identification, and the 
detection of cheats in Las Vegas or terrorists in Great Britain. Face recognition is 
receiving a substantial amount of attention by both academic and industrial 
researchers because of the broad applications of knowledge about how we recognize 
the faces of other human beings. Research in face recognition presents many 
challenges, and understanding the perception of and memory for faces is constantly 
presenting new questions to researchers trying to understand the many aspects of face 
recognition. 
One aspect of face recognition that has been the focus of several researchers 
for the past thirty years is known as the "other-race" effect. The other race effect can 
be defined as superior memory for own-race faces relative to faces of another race. 
Simply put, an asymmetry favoring recognition of own-race faces exists in many 
individuals. 
Because the definition of the "other-race" effect is extremely simple and 
straightforward one might believe that it is a ubiquitous phenomenon; however, 
establishing consistency in the appearance of the effect has proven to be elusive. For 
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example, although test-retest reliability data (Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000) and 
a meta-analysis conducted by Bothwell, Brigham, and Malpass (1985) support the 
notion that the "other-race" effect is robust across different samples, some studies 
have failed to show a cross-race face recognition deficit (e.g., Brigham & 
Williamson, 1979; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). Some 
individuals or even groups of individuals have been able to recognize other-race faces 
as well as same-race faces. Brigham, Maass, Snyder, and Spaulding (1982) reported 
that only marginally significant differences were found between correct 
identifications of White and African American individuals in a field setting (p<.07). 
Although results have been inconsistent, the "other-race" effect has remained a 
research topic of high priority. Finding factors that mediate and possibly explain the 
dynamics of a cross-race recognition deficit has been the focus of numerous studies 
inspired by the gravity of the "other-race" effect's social implications. 
Section One: The "Other-Race" Effect 
The significance of the "other-race" effect is clearly stated by Brigham and 
Malpass (1985) who postulate three separate social implications of the effect. First, 
when eyewitnesses identify a suspect of another race the accuracy of their report may 
be drastically reduced in light of a memory deficit for people of other-races. 
Misidentification of an innocent person has obvious social justice implications. 
Second, an inability to differentiate and remember people of another race can hamper 
interracial social interactions. "The consequences of misidentifying someone range 
from mildly embarrassing to extremely grave. Falsely greeting a stranger as an 
acquaintance may be an embarrassing or humorous event. But if the person is of a 
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different race, this misidentification may be perceived as an indication of prejudice or 
stereotyping ("We must all look alike to her!"), and this perception may hamper 
subsequent interactions." (Brigham and Malpass, 1985, p. 140). Finally, the inability 
to distinguish different members of a racial category could reinforce the perceived 
homogeneity of that group and lead to increased stereotyping. 
Clearly, understanding and attempting to attenuate the "other-race" effect is 
important. 
Experimental Methodologies and Statistics 
Generally, studies investigating the "other-race" effect have used one of two 
different methodological approaches. In order to simplify later discussion a brief 
description of these two methods will explain their normal order of operations and 
components. The first of these two methodologies will be referred to as "serial 
presentation and test" and the second will be called "matrix presentation and test." 
Both methodologies can contain either two or three components. The first of 
these components is a study period of the faces to be later remembered or "target" 
faces. The second component is not always employed and is a delay period between 
study and test. The third component is a face memory test in which participants are 
asked to identify target faces and novel or "distracter" faces. 
In serial presentation and test, faces are presented one at a time for a 
predetermined length of time (e.g., faces might be presented for 2 seconds each). 
Between each face is a short inter-stimulus interval designed to give participants 
enough time to prepare to see the next face to be presented. A delay between study 
and test may then occur. The final component of serial presentation is the memory 
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test. During the test period participants are shown target faces and distracter faces one 
at a time, usually for a predetermined length of time. Within the time allotted for 
each face, participants are asked to indicate whether a face is one that they have seen 
before (a target face) or a face that they have not seen before (a distracter face). 
Faces are presented in random order during study and test, usually with the constraint 
that very few faces of a particular race may be seen in direct succession of each other. 
Serial presentation is easily the most popular method for testing face memory. 
In matrix presentation and test many faces are presented at a time, in a block 
of faces or matrix configuration. Participants are given substantially longer periods 
of time to study target faces as many faces are being studied simultaneously. A delay 
may be included between study and test. During the test period distracter faces are 
included with target faces within a matrix. The participant is to identify the target 
faces within this matrix. The major difference between serial presentation and matrix 
presentation is that matrix presentation and test displays all of the faces 
simultaneously. 
Usually during a face memory test participants are asked to indicate whether 
they have seen a face before and therefore signal detection statistics have been 
accepted as the appropriate method of analysis for face memory tests. In accordance 
with signal detection analysis the results of a face memory test consist of four 
elements: hits, correct rejections, false alarms, and misses. A "hit" refers to the 
correct identification of a target face while a "correct rejection" refers to the correct 
identification of a distracter face. A "false alarm" occurs when a participant 
5 
incorrectly identifies a distracter face as a target face and a "miss" occurs when a 
participant incorrectly identifies a target face as a distracter face. 
Researchers usually apply the standard statistics of d' and A ' (the non-
parametric version of d') to the four types of responses in order to obtain a single 
metric for analysis. First, hits are divided by hits plus misses (h / (h + m)) in order to 
obtain a value for "hit rate." Second, false alarms are divided by false alarms plus 
correct rejections ( fa / (fa + cr)) in order to obtain a false alarm rate. Hit rates give us 
a value for the participant's memory for the target faces while the false alarm rate 
tells us to what degree the participant may be guessing "yes" to any face regardless of 
accuracy. Hit rates and false alarm rates are then matched to those on a d' or A' chart, 
where a single metric that represents the two values in conjunction with each other is 
marked by the specific hit rate and false alarm rate being matched. It is this single 
metric that is subjected to later statistical analysis (such as ANOVA). 
Both d' and A' are based in signal detection theory (SDT) and are useful for 
analyzing face memory performance because "SDT techniques should be used where 
possible to separate the truly retention-based aspects of memory performance from 
the decision aspects" (Banks, 1970, p.82). In other words, it is necessary to separate 
the true memory component of a participant's response pattern from the participant's 
response tendencies. For example, a participant may respond "yes" to every face that 
appears at test. This response tendency would give the participant a perfect hit rate, 
but his accuracy would be much less than perfect, because his false alarm rate would 
be high- which would in turn produce a lower d' score. High false alarm rates alert 
us to guessing behavior, while extremely low false alarm rates and low hit ratios tell 
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us that a participant is overly cautious when responding (the participant is responding 
"no" to almost every face). 
The use of d' and A' has been extremely popular in studies investigating the 
"other-race" effect, but in some cases a single metric representation of memory 
performance can be insensitive to the exact content structure of a participant's 
response pattern. Slone et al. (2000) raise concerns over the use of single metrics to 
represent memory performance because of the finding that very often White 
participants apply a lax selection criterion when asked if they remember a cross-race 
face; that is, White participants tend to select more African American faces as targets 
than White faces. This response pattern could reveal that White participants tend to 
be less strict towards deciding whether an African American face is a target face or 
not. Analyzing hits and false alarms without converting them into a single metric 
could give researchers more detail in their results and alert them to findings such as a 
lax selection criterion by a particular group of participants. D ' and A' give a 
researcher a high or low number, but do not reveal whether hit rate or false alarm rate 
is responsible for a given value. If the "other-race" effect in Whites is caused by a lax 
selection criterion then d' will fail to detect it, but analyzing hit and false alarm rates 
would. Nonetheless, the use of a single metric has remained popular due to its ability 
to give researchers a single comparable number that represents the participant's true 
memory for faces. 
Methodological Concerns 
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Before delving into the proposed explanations for the "other-race" effect it is 
important to first address certain methodological issues that could interfere with the 
proper measurement of face memory differences. 
The first issue to be discussed is possible stimulus effects. Does the selection 
of faces to be used in the memory task affect the way in which people remember 
faces? It is possible that some studies employed a more "memorable" set of faces for 
one race than another. A study conducted by Malpass and Kravitz (1969) found that 
African American participants remembered White faces better than did White 
participants, indicating that stimulus selection may have been a problem. However, 
the low scores of a highly deviant White participant were responsible for this result, 
and when his score was eliminated the result disappeared. Malpass and Kravitz ran 
an additional experiment to detect stimulus effects, and none were found. The care 
that Malpass and Kravitz took to insure that the actual stimuli selected did not affect 
performance highlights the importance of careful selection. Many studies have 
shown own race superiority in African Americans and Whites simultaneously, (Ayuk, 
1990; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Devine & Malpass, 
1985; Ellis & Deregowski, 1981) dispelling the idea that the faces selected as stimuli 
within one racial category were merely more memorable. 
Another possible stimulus effect that has been proposed as an explanation for 
the superior memorability of White faces is that the dark tone of African American 
faces could make features less salient by obscuring contour lines in the face being 
studied. "Photographs of darker faces might show fewer details than photos of White 
faces simply because the resolution of film for details in dark areas is poorer than its 
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resolution in light areas" (Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 1975, p.245). Therefore it 
is harder to encode identifying features when viewing African American photos, and 
subsequently harder to remember African American target faces. A study conducted 
by Chance et al. specifically tested this explanation of the "other-race" effect by using 
White, African American, and Asian faces. Results showed that both White and 
African American participants had the best memory for own race faces, but 
remembered Asian faces least well. Because Asian faces are light in tone and 
coloration does not obscure feature detail, the "other-race" effect cannot be explained 
by lack of definition in the facial features of a particular race. However, using high 
film quality for all face stimuli is crucial because darker faces may be more 
susceptible to distortion due to overall higher pixel density. 
The final stimulus effect that could render faces of one race more memorable 
than another is the actual level of homogeneity of face features and configuration. If 
the faces within one racial category vary more than the faces of another race, then that 
would explain why memory for faces of a particular race is superior. In a study using 
anthropomorphic data that measured the variability of facial features and 
configuration Goldstein (1979a, 1979b) reported that Black, White, and Asian faces 
were equal in actual variability. The only result to the contrary was that faces of 
Asian women were actually more variable than the faces of the other races. Although 
these findings are convincing, a study conducted by Wallendael and Kuhn (1997) 
found that both White and African American participants rated within race faces as 
being more distinct than other race faces. However, Goldstein and Chance (1978) 
found that White men and women did not perceive a difference in the variability 
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within sets of White and Asian faces. Because perceived homogeneity of faces 
within a racial category is more important than actual homogeneity the results of 
Wallendael and Kuhn should be taken into consideration when one is selecting face 
stimuli. Even in light of evidence to the contrary (e.g., Goldstein & Chance), a 
homogeneity effect may occur when a participant is encoding a set of other-race faces 
and therefore selecting faces that are highly similar to each other for a memory task 
should be avoided. 
Task effects such as number of faces displayed, display time, and delay 
between study and test may also influence the magnitude of the "other-race" effect. 
There has been little consistency across studies in the number of faces used in 
memory tasks. For example Chiroro and Valentine (1995) used 16 target faces (8 
White and 8 Black) during a study and included 16 (8 White and 8 Black) additional 
faces at test, using a total of 32 faces. Both White English and Black African 
participants with low interracial contact showed the "other-race" effect. Shephard, 
Deregowski, and Ellis (1974) used 20 target faces and 40 faces at test finding the 
"other-race" effect in both White British and Black African participants. Many 
studies have used the same number of faces as each other, both at study and test, but 
the results from the face memory tasks in these experiments have been inconsistent 
(Barkowitz & Brigham, 1982; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Brigham & Williamson, 
1979). These differences in outcomes indicate that the number of target faces and 
distracters is not an important feature when measuring the asymmetry between 
memory of own- and other-race faces. The decision to use a particular number of 
faces can be explained by the sensitivity levels necessary for proper statistical 
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analysis and the control of ceiling effects during test. Mediating effects of number of 
faces used have not been discussed in relation to the "other-race" effect, but it is 
apparent that using anywhere from 16-32 target faces does not alter results. 
The length of time that a face is displayed during the study period is also a 
factor that may affect memory for different types of faces. It could be argued that at 
shorter presentation periods faces of another race cannot be remembered as well, but 
at longer presentation periods memory for these faces might be improved diminishing 
face memory asymmetry. MacLin, MacLin, and Malpass (2001) directly tested the 
effects that display time might have on other-race face recognition. Hispanic 
participants were tested for face memory of both same race and African American 
faces presented at study of either .5 seconds or 5 seconds. They found that while face 
memory increased as presentation time increased the differences between memory for 
Hispanic and African American faces remained constant. Memory for both types of 
faces increased equally, showing no attenuation of the "other-race" effect. Therefore, 
although longer presentation times can lead to better memory for faces, as long as the 
presentation time for all types of faces is equal, same race faces are still remembered 
with greater accuracy. 
Finally, the effects of delay between study and test have been of great interest 
to those involved with assessing eyewitness accuracy. Can a period of delay equalize 
the memory for both same- and other-race faces? Barkowitz and Brigham (1982) 
tested face memory of both Whites and African American participants for White and 
African American faces after delays of zero, two days, and seven days. Memory for 
White and African American faces did decrease over time, but not at different rates. 
White participants showed the "other-race" effect at zero delay, after two days, and 
after seven days. Chance et al. (1975) also found no effects of a 48-hour delay on 
participants' memory for White, African American, and Asian faces. MacLin et al. 
(2001) also tested the effects that delay might have on memory for same- and other-
race faces. Participants were tested for face memory either immediately or after 30 
minutes had elapsed. No difference in face memory was found after the 30-minute 
delay. A common delay time between study and test is five minutes (Ayuk, 1990; 
Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Brigham & Williamson, 1979; O'Toole, Deffenbacher, 
Valentin, & Abdi, 1994) although some studies have not included a delay (Chance, 
Turner, & Goldstein, 1982; Goldstein & Chance, 1980). Delay inclusion appears to 
be necessary only in avoiding ceiling effects and is not useful in explaining the 
"other-race" effect. 
Explaining the "Other-Race " Effect 
From the above discussion it is clear that the "other-race" effect is a robust 
phenomenon that has been of great interest to many researchers. However, finding 
the cause of the effect has proven to be elusive. In fact, five different hypotheses 
have been postulated as potential causes of the "other-race" effect (Brigham & 
Malpass, 1985). The first of these hypotheses is the idea that faces of one race may 
be inherently less variant than faces of another race and therefore less recognizable. 
As discussed earlier, no evidence to support this hypothesis has been found. 
"Differential orientation" to faces at presentation has also been suggested to be a 
possible cause of the "other-race" effect. A White person may make personality 
inferences about a White face, but make only superficial (male or female) inferences 
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about an African American face (Chance & Goldstein, 1981). Therefore, the White 
face may be encoded at a deeper level and is remembered with greater ease. A third 
hypothesis about other-race face memory is that the degree of contact an individual 
may have with people of a different race has a direct effect on how well he/she can 
remember other-race faces (Brigham & Malpass). This idea is referred to as the 
"contact hypothesis." The contact hypothesis has been explored independently and 
also within the constraints of various theoretical frameworks. The fourth hypothesis is 
similar in some ways to the differential orientation hypothesis in that it states that 
superior encoding of same race faces is responsible for the "other-race" effect. In 
essence, this feature selection hypothesis states that the "race" feature of the face 
precludes the encoding of individuating information and therefore no clear memory 
for the face is ever created (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). Levin (2000) has recently 
found tentative evidence to support this hypothesis. A fifth hypothesis is that negative 
racial attitudes can diminish other-race face memory. 
The following sections will be dedicated to describing in detail the research 
that has been conducted in the exploration of how differential orienting, inter-racial 
contact, racial attitudes, and "race" as a dominant feature affect other-race face 
memory. Each hypothesis will be discussed independently and include theories that 
arose in light of them. Although the primary focus of this thesis will be the "other-
race" effect as it pertains to Whites recognizing African American faces, experiments 
involving Asian faces will be included in the review of past research because of the 
importance of their contributions towards the understanding of the "other-race" 
effect. 
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Differential Orienting and Depth of Processing in relation to the "Other-Race " 
Effect 
Differential orienting has been shown to affect an individual's ability to 
remember faces (Bower & Karlin, 1974). Orienting can be defined as the particular 
approach an individual takes when extracting information from a given face. The two 
types of orienting studied in relation to the "other-race" effect are superficial and 
inferential (Devine & Malpass, 1985). If an individual orients towards superficial 
information given by a face that they encounter the individual may say that the face 
was "White" or "male." During superficial orienting the individual only encodes the 
information given by the physical attributes of a particular face. Inferential orienting, 
on the other hand, leads an individual to make attributions about the person whose 
face they are viewing. If an individual was inferentially orienting towards a certain 
face an attribution of "mean" or "confident" may be made about the person to whom 
the face belongs. Subsequently, superficial and inferential orienting towards face 
stimuli have been shown to lead to differential memory for faces due to differences in 
the depth of processing that occurs during the encoding period (Bower & Karlin, 
1974). Participants using the deeper inferential processing orientation remembered 
faces better than participants who used the shallower superficial processing 
orientation. This face memory asymmetry can be explained by inferential processing 
providing individuals information about a face that superficial processing does not, 
the face is given an added characteristic that makes it more memorable (Chance & 
Goldstein, 1981). 
14 
Chance and Goldstein (1981) put forth the proposition that people may orient 
inferentially to same race faces while orienting superficially to other-race faces on the 
basis of familiarity. "When confronted with a face from a class of faces not familiar 
to us, could we feel less able to draw inferences about the other's moods, attitudes, 
and personality characteristics than we feel to draw those inferences when we are 
confronted with a face similar to our own or those of our daily associates?" (p.476). 
If inferential orienting was only present for same-race faces at encoding then the 
superiority for memory of same-race faces could be explained. It was also 
hypothesized that both superficial orienting to other-race faces and inferential 
orienting to same-race faces are automatic reactions. To test these hypotheses 
Chance and Goldstein asked participants to describe White, Asian, or African 
American faces as they were presented. Each participant was presented twenty 
projected photographs in a serial manner and each participant viewed only one type 
of picture (White, Asian, or African American). Each face was presented for two 
seconds and during an inter-stimulus interval that lasted for fifteen seconds 
participants were instructed to write down their descriptions of the face previously 
presented. White participants were shown to write inferential descriptions of White 
faces, while other-race faces were described in a superficial manner. Therefore 
evidence that the "other-race" effect could be linked to differential depth of 
processing was uncovered. But unfortunately, a planned memory task could not be 
completed due to participant attrition so no direct link between orienting style and 
other-race face memory was made. 
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Devine and Malpass (1985) decided to test the differential orienting 
hypothesis by experimentally manipulating the orienting style of participants. White 
and African American participants were placed into one of three conditions. The first 
condition was an intentional learning condition in which participants were told that 
they were supposed to remember the faces that would be presented to them. In the 
second and third conditions participants were told that they would be making 
judgments about faces. In the second condition (the inferential judgment condition) 
participants were instructed to mark a face as either "Friendly" or "Unfriendly." In 
the third condition (superficial judgment condition) participants were instructed to 
mark a face as either "White" or "Black." Faces were presented in a serial manner 
and only participants in the intentional learning condition were aware that a memory 
task was to follow face presentation. Results showed that although manipulating 
depth of processing did affect face memory, superior memory for same-race faces 
was always retained. Memory for both African American and White faces was higher 
in the inferential condition than in the superficial condition and the intentional 
learning condition, but same-race faces were always remembered better than other-
race faces by White and African American participants. Therefore it was concluded 
that although memory was improved by taking an inferential orientation differences 
in depth of processing of same- and other-race faces did not explain own-race face 
memory superiority. 
Although the differential orienting hypothesis was not clearly linked to the 
"other-race" effect it did reveal that on some level own- and other-race faces are not 
processed in the same manner. More initial attention seems to be paid to 
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individuating characteristics of same-race individuals as opposed to other-race 
individuals. Higher degrees of personalizing members of one's own race directly 
relates to the hypothesis offered by Levin (2000) that will be discussed in detail in the 
section on the "Feature-Selection" hypothesis. 
The Contact Hypothesis 
Many researchers have tested the idea that the amount of inter-racial contact 
one has will have a direct effect on how well an individual can remember faces of 
another race. Those with high levels of inter-racial contact should not show a 
memory deficit for other-race faces, while those with low levels of contact should 
show the memory deficit. A relationship between amount of inter-racial contact and 
other-race face memory should exist, and empirical evidence supporting this 
relationship has been found in several studies. 
Three different methods have been developed for testing the contact 
hypothesis. The first of these methods is to test face memory of pre-existing groups 
of individuals that differ in their level of opportunity to interact with members of 
another race. The second of these methods is to administer a self-report questionnaire 
that asks participants about their past and present amount of contact with other-race 
individuals. This questionnaire is accompanied by a face memory task. The third 
method used for testing the hypothesis trains individuals to remember other-race 
faces by increasing their exposure to other-race faces in a controlled laboratory 
setting. In studies that employ training there are usually several face memory tests 
and it is expected that as exposure to other-race faces increases, face memory will 
improve. The findings of studies conducted in accordance with these three methods 
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will be discussed as evidence supporting the contact hypothesis and as expansions on 
the idea of contact. Various theories developed in light of the contact hypothesis will 
be discussed. These theories include schema theory (Goldstein & Chance, 1980), the 
'multidimensional space' model (Valentine, Chiroro, & Dixon, 1995), and the 
perceptual specialization theory (O'Toole, Peterson, & Deffenbacher, 1996). 
Method 1: Pre-existing groups. The use of pre-existing groups in order to 
measure the relationship between contact and the "other-race" effect has taken place 
within the United States and in other countries around the world. Results of studies 
conducted within the United States are not as easy to interpret as the results of studies 
carried out in more clearly racially isolated societies. As will be discussed, the effects 
of the American media may contaminate efforts to look singularly at everyday life 
inter-racial contact and its relation to other-race face recognition. Nonetheless, the 
findings of studies carried out in the United States are important in providing a clearer 
picture of how different mediums of contact can mediate the "other-race" effect. 
An early study conducted in the U.S. by Cross et al. (1971) looked at how 
segregation or integration of neighborhoods and schools affected same- and other-
race face memory. African American adolescents were found to show equal memory 
for both White and African American faces, regardless of integration status. White 
adolescents showed better memory for White faces, regardless of integration status. 
Cross et al. explain this result by stating that possible media exposure to Whites could 
lead to greater contact for African Americans regardless of the integration level of the 
participants' everyday life. Alternately, Whites having very little media exposure to 
African Americans should be at a disadvantage in amount of other-race contact. 
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Although little direct evidence was obtained to support the contact hypothesis (degree 
of segregation did not have an effect upon the results of the face recognition task) the 
explanation offered by Cross et al. may account for African Americans' equal 
memory for White and African American faces. 
A simpler study conducted by Chance et al. (1975) found more convincing 
evidence to support the contact hypothesis. Chance et al. reasoned that White 
participants would have the most experience with own-race faces, have less 
experience with African American faces, and have the least experience with Asian 
faces. Therefore, face memory should be greatest for White faces, intermediate for 
African American faces, and poorest for Asian faces. The first experiment in this 
study tested this hypothesis by using a serial presentation task to test White 
participants for memory of White, African American, and Asian faces. As predicted, 
White faces were remembered best, followed by African American faces, and Asian 
faces were remembered least. In order to bolster these results a second experiment 
was carried out that included both White and African American participants. In this 
experiment it was hypothesized that same-race faces would be remembered with the 
most accuracy, and that Asian faces would be remembered with the least accuracy. 
Again, the results confirmed the expectations of the experimenters. Own-race faces 
were remembered best for both White and African American participants and Asian 
faces were remembered the worst for both groups. This pattern of results supports the 
contact hypothesis. Both White and African American participants showed the least 
amount of accuracy when tested for a type of face that they would logically have the 
least amount of contact with. At the same time participants showed the best accuracy 
19 
when tested for the type of face that they would logically have the most amount of 
contact with. 
Chance et al. (1975) continued their analysis by conducting a chi-square test 
in order to determine how many participants actually met the expected pattern of face 
recognition accuracy (same race > intermediate race > Asian). The first chi-square 
test did not show that the predicted pattern was met, but after altering the test criterion 
to include cases where African American participants remembered White and African 
American faces equally the chi-square test did reach significance. Chance et al. 
explain this revision by stating that because American society is dominated by 
Whites, some African Americans may show no superiority for own-race faces in 
comparison to White faces. The results of Chance et al. give further support to the 
explanation that Cross et al. (1971) apply to their findings. Simply stated, African 
Americans are likely to have more contact with Whites through media exposure (etc.) 
and therefore may sometimes show equal memory for African American and White 
faces. A third study supporting this idea tested students from a predominately 
African American university and a predominately White university and also found 
that regardless of the racial majority, White and African American faces were 
remembered equally by African American participants (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). 
Studies that have been conducted outside of the United States are easier to 
interpret because the effects of media and the social dominance (not socioeconomic 
or political dominance) of Whites do not interfere with simple contact effects. In one 
such study, Shephard et al. (1974) tested African men from the Rhodesian army, 
African women related to them, British entrants into the armed forces, and British 
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women from Aberdeen, Scotland, for memory of same- and other-race faces. Contact 
with members of another race was highly unlikely for any of the four groups and 
superior own-race face memory was found for both African and British participants. 
In a similar study Chiroro and Valentine (1995) found that adolescents in 
northern England (British) and rural Zimbabwe (African) also showed a pronounced 
difference in ability to remember same- vs. other-race faces. Both of these groups of 
adolescents had extremely limited contact with members of another race and showed 
superior memory for own-race faces. Adolescents that attended an integrated school 
in Zimbabwe were also included in the study. Surprisingly, the performance patterns 
for the integrated adolescents matched perfectly with the results found in the studies 
conducted in the United States. Integrated African participants showed equal 
memory for both African and White faces, while integrated White participants 
showed superior memory for own-race faces. 
The results reported by Shephard et al. (1974) and Chiroro and Valentine 
(1995) provide evidence supporting the contact hypothesis. But these results were 
nearly called into question by another study that included Whites and Asians. Ng and 
Lindsay (1994) found that Asians in Singapore had better memory for White faces 
than did Asians in Canada. This result runs counter to the contact hypothesis, which 
would have predicted the opposite result. Subsequently, the statistical analysis 
conducted by Ng and Lindsay was shown to be inadequate (Valentine et al., 1995) 
and therefore their results must be discredited. 
Method 2: Self-report questionnaires. The use of self-report measures to 
ascertain the amount of inter-racial contact of a participant has been a very popular 
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method. Self-report measures are easy to administer, although at times hard to create. 
But in trying to obtain a highly sensitive quantifiable measure of inter-racial contact 
one has little choice but to rely on the information that the participant provides. 
One of the earliest studies to use a contact questionnaire was conducted by 
Malpass and Kravitz (1969). Participants were selected from a predominately 
African American or predominately White university and were given a serial 
presentation face recognition task along with a short contact questionnaire. "The 
questionnaire asked about the number of other-race persons of various roles and 
occupational categories encountered in the course of an average week's time. This 
number and the number identified as persons known by first name (reciprocally) was 
added to a score obtained by inquiring about the number of other-race persons in 
various capacities in the subject's school classes from elementary to secondary 
school" (p.334). Results showed that while African American participants from the 
predominately White university reported more inter-racial contact than White 
participants from that university, no relationship between face recognition scores and 
the questionnaire was found. This null result could be taken as evidence to the 
contrary of the contact hypothesis, but Malpass and Kravitz explain that "These are 
weak tests of the differential experience hypothesis, however, and the number of 
cases is small" (p.334). 
Since the study conducted by Malpass and Kravitz (1969), experimenters have 
tried to develop questionnaires that tap into contact in more detail and also to measure 
"meaningful contact." One of Malpass and Kravitz's explanations for the null 
relationship between the questionnaire and face recognition task was that it was 
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possible that only contact in which the individual interacts in a meaningful way with a 
cross-race other can lead to greater face memory ability. Another study that failed to 
inquire about the nature of cross-race exposure also did not detect a relationship 
between contact and face recognition (Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978). 
More sensitive questionnaires have tapped into the depth of contact with 
other-race individuals and have detected a relationship between meaningful contact 
and other-race face memory. Lavrakas, Buri, and Mayzner (1976) found that 
reported cross-racial friendships had a direct relationship with how well an individual 
remembered faces of another race. When studying the "other-race" effect with 
African American and African participants Carroo (1986) reported a significant 
correlation between reported friendships with Whites and memory for White faces. A 
significant correlation between reported close White family friends and memory for 
White faces was also found in this study. Brigham et al. (1982) also asked 
participants about other-race friendships and how often they worked closely with 
members of another race (either White or African American depending on the race of 
the participant). Again, a positive relationship was found between face recognition 
and the contact questionnaire. 
Recently, Slone et al. (2000) have developed the Social Experience 
Questionnaire (SEQ) that consists of 56 questions intended to tap into an individual's 
level of interracial contact in four separate contexts: business settings, personal-
intimate settings, personal-nonintimate settings, and public settings. Integration level 
of neighborhood and school were included as well. Unlike past interracial contact 
questionnaires the SEQ includes four additional questions that are intended to 
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measure the degree to which each of the four separate contexts has yielded positive or 
negative experiences. The inclusion of these questions adds a personal dimension to 
the questionnaire that assesses an individual's gains from interracial experience. 
An orthogonal factor analysis revealed six specific dimensions with the SEQ 
that further defined exactly what was being measured. Although a detailed 
explanation of each of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper a brief summary 
of what the six factors contained should be included. The six dimensions of the SEQ 
tapped into both personal intimate and non-personal non-intimate interracial contact 
spanning an individual's entire life (including present level of interracial contact) 
including their expectations for future interracial contact and the utility-pleasantness 
of their past interracial experiences. 
Scores on the facial identification task were related to only one factor of the 
SEQ, present interracial contact. This factor included questions that asked about 
current friends of a different race, but did not include past interracial friendships. The 
breadth of the SEQ has surpassed past efforts to create sensitive interracial contact 
questionnaires, but has yielded the same results. So far, in research that has measured 
contact through questionnaires cross-racial friendship has been the only factor 
receiving support as a mediator of other-race face recognition. Meaningful contact 
could therefore be more carefully defined as intimate contact. 
Method 3: Training studies. Although studies that have been conducted on 
pre-existing groups or have used self-report measures have provided adequate 
evidence to support the notion that interracial contact can affect memory for other-
race faces, the best evidence for the contact hypothesis has come through training 
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studies. Training studies provide a way to observe the effects of contact on memory 
for other-race faces by recording face memory performance as experience with cross-
race faces is systematically increased in a laboratory setting. 
A study conducted by Malpass, Laviguer, and Weldon (1973) was designed to 
test the idea that verbal memory for a face related to actual face recall in a visual 
recognition task. The logic behind this study was that because verbal memory had 
been related to memory for visual items (such as facial expression), verbal memory 
may play an important role in face recognition as well. The goal of Malpass et al. 
was to improve participants' verbal memory for faces through training and then to 
test the participants' face memory. Malpass et al. gave participants different amounts 
of training on three separate verbal description tasks (a) recognize from description 
task, (b) describe to a friend task, and (c) face comparison task and then tested face 
memory. Although the results showed that the verbal ability to complete the three 
training tasks improved as training increased, no relationship between verbal training 
and the actual face recognition scores was found. 
In a second experiment Malpass et al. (1973) tested the effects of feedback on 
face memory. All participants in the second study were given four blocks of trials, 
each block consisting of a complete set of recognition trials. Trials were set up so 
that a participant was first shown four faces in a serial manner, and after a delay the 
participant was presented with four comparison faces from which he/she was to select 
the face previously seen. Feedback was given immediately following each response. 
Feedback was given either as electric shock, verbal feedback, or no feedback at all 
according to the feedback group that the participant had been assigned to. If a 
25 
participant did not correctly identify the target face a negative outcome followed 
(electric shock or a voice saying "wrong"). If a participant was correct no negative 
outcome followed (no electric shock or a voice saying "correct"). The results of this 
study showed that while there was no significant difference between feedback type 
(as long a feedback was given), feedback training did lead to improved face memory. 
However, one problem with this experiment is that during the course of training 
several faces were used more than once as they served the function of both target and 
distracter. The results of the recognition task across training blocks formed a non-
linear U-shaped pattern that suggested to the experimenters that some interference 
was occurring due to the use of faces more than once. Nevertheless, face memory did 
improve. 
Malpass et al. (1973) have shown that even brief exposure to training 
procedures can lead to an increase in face memory performance, especially under 
conditions of high motivation. Goldstein and Chance (1985) tested the effects that 
training would have over a long period of time to further investigate the malleability 
of the "other-race" effect. Following a face recognition pretest, White participants 
completed six practice sessions in which they were required to learn five to eight 
(depending on the ability of the participant) Japanese faces. Although participants 
learned five to eight faces the criterion to stop subsequent memory testing was three 
correct identifications. Within a single training session participants were required to 
learn two sets of Japanese faces. After training was completed for each participant 
serial presentation memory tasks were administered "2-4 days after training, 1 month 
after, and 5 months after the final training session" (p.212). A control group was also 
included in the face memory tasks, but received no training. 
Goldstein and Chance (1985) found that while trained participants did not 
differ from control participants in memory for White faces across memory tasks, 
training vastly improved performance for Japanese faces. The improvement in 
recognition ability for trained participants remained stable at the second memory task 
(1 month after) and actually increased at the final testing session 5 months after 
training. Surprisingly, untrained control participants also increased memory for 
Japanese faces dramatically 5 months after their initial memory test. Goldstein and 
Chance note that the improvement of the control participants could be due to the 
repetition of the memory tasks that could have served as a sort of training for them. 
The first study (Malpass et al., 1973) discussed in this section clearly 
demonstrated that experimentally increasing exposure to other-race faces could lead 
to a change in immediate recognition ability. Additionally, findings provided by 
Goldstein and Chance (1985) show that increased exposure can also lead to more 
long-term changes in other-race face memory ability. Unfortunately, although 
training studies have clearly shown evidence that the contact hypothesis is correct, 
they have shown little promise as to explaining the dynamics of the "other-race" 
effect. 
Three theories within the domain of the contact hypothesis. Many studies 
investigating the contact hypothesis have attempted to find an explanation for the 
"other-race" effect by discovering "where" and "when" it occurs. Pre-existing groups 
and contact questionnaire studies have shown that individuals with varying social 
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experiences differ in ability to remember other-race faces, while training studies have 
provided ample evidence that systematically increasing motivation to remember or 
exposure to other-race faces increases other-race face memory. Unfortunately, while 
these studies elucidate the role that certain factors may play in other-race face 
memory, they do not explain the underlying dynamics of the "other-race" effect. 
Within the domain of the contact hypothesis the three separate theories that attempt to 
explain how same- and other-race face memory works are schema theory (Goldstein 
& Chance, 1980), the 'face space' model (Valentine et al., 1995), and the perceptual 
specialization theory (O'Toole et al., 1996). Although an in-depth discussion of the 
research conducted to validate these theories is not relevant to the project being 
proposed in this paper, a brief description of each of them should show that 
researchers are attempting to explain the processes at work during same- and other-
race face recognition. 
Schema theory (Goldstein & Chance, 1980) postulates that individuals have 
superior memory for same-race faces because individuals develop highly efficient and 
specialized strategies for processing faces that are developed through experience. 
These strategies can also be seen as the individual's preconceived method of 
organizing face information or face processing schema. Chance et al. (1982) explain 
the idea of a face schema by saying "Schemas function by producing expectations 
which direct attention to certain aspects of faces, making attending to and encoding 
them relatively fast, automatic, and efficient" (p.31). Direct ties between schema 
theory and the contact hypothesis are made by Goldstein and Chance who state "a 
face schema becomes increasingly 'tuned' to the commonly seen class of face stimuli 
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after repeated interactions with exemplars of that class, and faces that fall outside the 
class are ultimately more inefficiently processed than faces matching the schema" 
(p.51). Schemas are thought to be limiting in that they require a specialization for 
face type most commonly seen; thus as age increases, memory for other-race faces 
should become inferior to memory for same-race faces. 
The multidimensional space model, or MDS (Valentine et al., 1995; Valentine 
& Endo, 1992), is similar to schema theory (Goldstein & Chance, 1980) in that it 
postulates that because face memory mechanisms are adaptive, greater experience 
with a type of face (e.g., African American female faces) allows face memory 
mechanisms to develop highly specialized and efficient discrimination and memory 
capabilities. In essence, it could be said that MDS is a highly defined version of 
schema theory because although the premises of MDS are identical to those of 
schema theory, MDS offers an account of how face recognition works at a functional 
level. Although Valentine (1991) argues that schema theory is inadequate on the 
basis of research that contradicts the premise that recognition accuracy for other-race 
faces decreases with age, MDS remains based in the same reasoning used by 
Goldstein and Chance. It is the functional aspect of MDS that separates it from 
schema theory, which does not provide a functional account of face memory. 
Exemplar-based MDS works within a theoretical area representing the spatial 
relationships between faces in memory and faces introduced as stimuli. The distance 
between objects within the theoretical area determines the likelihood of a correct 
identification. 
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Exemplar-based MDS proposes that faces are stored in memory in spatial 
relation to each other, their position in relation to each other being determined by the 
degree to which they differ on relevant facial dimensions. Faces differ from one 
another along many dimensions (e.g., breadth of nose). The dimensions and degree to 
which these dimensions vary between faces determine a face's location in relation to 
other faces. Therefore, typical faces will form a tight cluster, leaving little space 
between each other because the differences between typical faces are not pronounced. 
Distinctive faces will have a greater distance between them and other faces. When an 
individual is attempting to remember a previously seen face distinctiveness plays a 
major role as it determines the number of similar distracter faces stored in memory 
that are placed in proximity to the target face. Typical faces are in very close 
proximity to many other typical faces as they all surround each other in a tight cluster. 
Accordingly, typical faces are easier to confuse for one another. As distinctive faces 
are placed far away from other faces (because they differ from the other faces to a 
great degree) recognition is easier. Also, because of the great distance between the 
distinctive target face and the others stored in memory a false positive response is less 
likely to occur. 
Within MDS experience determines the degree to which an individual 
becomes attuned to the proper dimensions by which to differentiate faces and the 
degree to which they become adept at making fine discriminations between 
differences along these dimensions. Valentine et al. (1995) argue that other-race 
faces are encoded along dimensions that may be appropriate for same-race faces, but 
inappropriate for other-race faces. Therefore, the optimal dimensions by which an 
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individual could differentiate one other-race face from another are left out, and poor 
recognition occurs. 
The perceptual specialization theory (O'Toole, Herve, Deffenbacher, & 
Valentin, 1995) also stresses the importance of experience on an individual's ability 
to recognize and remember faces accurately. Like schema theory (Goldstein & 
Chance, 1980) and MDS (Valentine et al., 1995) the perceptual specialization theory 
states that memory for faces becomes highly specialized as an individual's experience 
with a particular class of faces increases. O'Toole et al. (1996) compare perceptual 
specialization of faces to that same process in language learning. As we become 
familiar with our own language "we become adept at detecting the linguistic features 
most useful for distinguishing among speech sounds in our own language. 
Unfortunately, these features are not optimally suited for making phonemic contrasts 
in other languages" (p.670). 
At the functional level perceptual specialization theory (O'Toole et al., 1995) 
states that as multiple examples of a particular face type are encoded, memory for 
these faces is stored in an autoassociative network that places weighted values upon 
facial characteristics. The weight assigned to a particular facial characteristic is 
determined by the degree to which multiple face exemplars have provided a large 
array of variations of the face feature that are stored in memory. Individual 
characteristics (such as a nose) and relational aspects (such as the distance between 
the nose and the upper lip) are seen as important factors, as is face texture. As an 
encountered face is recalled the various characteristics that make up the face are 
reconstructed from memory, but the degree of detail with which the characteristics 
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(and ultimately the entire face) are reconstructed is determined by the weights of the 
facial characteristics. The greater the experience with a class of faces, the more 
defined the reconstruction. In the case of other-race faces the reconstruction is ill-
defined as the system has inadequate and/or inappropriate information with which to 
reconstruct the face. Therefore, when viewing an other-race face indicating whether 
it is one that has been seen before would be difficult for a participant because any 
reconstruction for that class of faces would leave substantial room for error as detail 
is diminished. 
Closing statements on the "contact hypothesis. " It can be easily said that the 
contact hypothesis has been the most thoroughly studied explanation of the "other-
race" effect and is to a great degree empirically substantiated. The contact hypothesis 
has also led to the development of many theoretical frameworks from which to 
explore the "other-race" effect, such as the multidimensional space model (Valentine 
& Bruce, 1986a; Valentine & Bruce, 1986b; Valentine & Endo, 1992; Valentine et 
al., 1995) and the perceptual specialization theory (O'Toole et al., 1995). But, as the 
project being proposed in this paper does not address theoretical issues within the 
confines of the contact hypothesis, the discussion of it and the relevant research has 
been brief. 
Feature Selection and the "Other-Race " Effect 
The feature-selection hypothesis states that differential memory for faces of 
own- and other-race occurs because individuals attend to the "race" aspect of a face 
and do not properly encode individuating information necessary to remember a face 
(Levin, 2000). Like the differential orientation hypothesis, the feature selection 
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hypothesis contends that the encoding strategy employed by an individual determines 
the ability of that person to remember a face. Levin provides evidence for the feature 
selection hypothesis in four separate experiments. 
The first two of these experiments involve visual search, a task that requires 
participants to search a visual field for a target item that is imbedded within a large 
number of distracter items. Targets and distracters can be either feature positive 
items or feature negative items. A feature negative item can be any object (e.g., a 
circle) and a feature positive item is identical to the feature negative item except that 
it has one additional component to it (e.g., a circle with a line through it). When 
visual search involves a feature negative target embedded in a field of feature positive 
distracters search for the target is slower than when a feature positive target is 
searched for among feature negative distracters. The difference between search times 
in various types of search fields is known as search asymmetry. Levin (2000) used 
search asymmetry to demonstrate that individuals who show the "other-race" effect 
also use "race" as a visual feature, while individuals who do not show the "other-
race" effect do not. Therefore, in Levin's search task African American faces would 
be feature positive, and White faces would be feature negative to individuals who use 
race as a visual feature. Those who do not use race as a visual feature would only see 
faces, with no positive feature being attended to for either White or African American 
faces. 
In the first experiment participants completed a face recognition task and were 
then put into two groups according to performance. Participants who did not show a 
cross-race face memory deficit were put into a no deficit group, and participants who 
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showed a cross-race face memory deficit were put into a deficit group. Both groups 
completed a visual search task. Results showed that individuals who did not show a 
cross-race face memory deficit also did not show search asymmetry, but individuals 
who did show a cross-race face memory deficit did show search asymmetry (although 
this effect was very small). Levin (2000) concludes that the first experiment provides 
evidence for the feature-selection hypothesis. The purpose of experiment two was to 
make sure that the search asymmetry observed in experiment one was not caused by 
different encoding strategies (relational vs. featural) of same-race and cross-race faces 
by those who showed the "other-race" effect. In experiment two Levin inverted the 
faces in the search task and reasoned that if differences in encoding strategies were 
responsible for the search asymmetry then inversion would lead to no asymmetry. 
The results of experiment two showed search asymmetry favoring the detection of 
African American target faces, adding additional support for the feature-selection 
hypothesis. 
Experiment three and four did not involve a visual search task. Experiment 
three required participants to view a series of variations between faces on the "race" 
dimension and to discriminate between them. The two endpoints and blended faces 
were to be used in a discrimination task and a categorization task. Levin (2000) 
hypothesized that if "race" was being used as a visual feature in African American 
faces, but not in White faces, participants would be able to discriminate between 
blended faces that appeared African American (10% White- 40% White) with greater 
accuracy. The logic behind this hypothesis was that if individuals are more attentive 
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to "race" when viewing African American faces then they should be more sensitive to 
variations among racially relevant features. 
The discrimination task required participants to match blended faces to the 
endpoints according to how similar a face was to a given endpoint. Blended faces 
were paired at 20% increments in order to test how well participants could 
discriminate between African American faces and White faces that differed along 
racially relevant features. The results of the discrimination task revealed that 
participants were better at discriminating between African American faces that varied 
along racially relevant features than White faces. From these results Levin (2000) 
concludes that, as the feature-selection hypothesis would predict, White participants 
are more attuned to racially relevant features in African American faces than they are 
in White faces. Experiment four was used to control for an alternate explanation of 
the results of experiment three, but as experiment four is not related to the "other-
race" effect it should suffice to say that Levin found that the results of study three 
remained consistent with the feature-selection hypothesis. 
The findings of an earlier study conducted by Lavrakas et al. (1976) add 
additional support to the feature-selection hypothesis. Lavrakas et al. trained 
participants to pay special attention to the internal features of other-race faces. 
Lavrakas et al. concluded that one possible explanation for improved memory for 
other-race faces after training was that participants were attending to the individual 
characteristics of faces, instead of ignoring individual characteristics because of the 
interference of the "race" aspect of a face. 
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Lavrakas et al. (1976) created three conditions in which to place White 
participants. After completing a facial recognition pretest participants were randomly 
assigned to a simple learning task, a conjunctive learning task or a control group. In 
both training groups (simple learning task and conjunctive learning task) the 
participants were trained with faces constructed using an identi-kit so that the 
experimenters could manipulate the internal and external features of each face used. 
In the simple learning task participants were shown faces that had "light eyes" 
and faces without "light eyes." "Light eyes" served as the 'concept' in this 
condition. The identi-kit faces were presented in a serial manner, and the participant 
was required to inform the experimenter whether the face being presented represented 
the 'concept' to be learned or did not represent the 'concept.' Participants continued 
this task until they achieved "five correct responses in a row" (Lavrakas et al., 1976, 
p.477), meaning that some participants were exposed to more identi-kit faces than 
others contingent upon their performance in the training task. 
In the conjunctive learning task participants were shown faces that had dark 
eyes and thick lips and faces that did not have dark eyes and thick lips. Participants 
in the conjunctive learning group were matched to participants in the simple learning 
task on trial number. So, if a participant in the simple learning task completed 43 
trials before reaching criterion a participant in the conjunctive learning task condition 
would be given 43 learning trials. As in the simple learning task participants scanned 
each face and decided whether a face represented the concept to be learned or did not. 
The control condition required participants to judge each face on attractiveness. 
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Lavrakas et al. (1976) hypothesized that training individuals to pay special 
attention to the internal features of other-race faces would increase face memory 
performance. Therefore, participants in both training conditions were expected to 
display better memory for other-race faces than participants in the control condition. 
A short delay followed training after which each participant was given another face 
recognition task. A third face recognition task followed a week later. Results showed 
that both training groups remembered African American faces better than did the 
control group, but that a week later the increase in performance had declined, 
indicating that the effects of the training were fleeting. Lavrakas et al. interpreted 
their findings as supporting the idea that if an individual is trained to pay attention to 
the internal features of a face, then the "race" aspect of the face will become less 
salient and therefore will not impede normal face processing. 
Levin (2000) and Lavrakas et al. (1976) provide evidence to support the 
feature selection hypothesis, but before one can rule out alternate explanations several 
questions should be addressed. For example, the effects of cross-racial experience on 
search asymmetry and visual discrimination should be explored. Levin's conclusions 
are also based on very small effects and search fields comprised of very few search 
items. 
Racial Attitudes and the "Other-Race " Effect 
The hypothesis that negative racial attitudes lead to poor recognition of other-
race faces is mainly based on research conducted by Seeleman (1940), who found that 
Whites with negative racial attitudes recognized African American faces worse than 
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did Whites with more positive racial attitudes. Despite this early success, most of the 
subsequent research has yielded very different results. 
Studies following the research conducted by Seeleman have found very little 
evidence to support the hypothesis that racial attitudes affect an individual's ability to 
remember faces of another race. After reviewing past research that tested the 
"attitudinal" hypothesis, Brigham and Malpass (1985) state that "studies that have 
directly measured both interracial attitudes and cross-race face recognition have 
generally found no association between racial attitudes and recognition accuracy" 
(p. 148). Brigham and Malpass are echoed by Chance and Goldstein (1996): "To 
summarize, self-reported, generalized attitudes about other groups do not appear to be 
related to observed differences in differential memory for their faces" (p. 158). 
Studies that have tested racial attitudes in relation to the "other-race" effect 
have generally relied upon correlational methods to determine the relationship 
between scores on explicit racial attitude measures and face memory performance. 
Questionnaires that have been used in these studies include: the Racial Attitudes 
Scale (Sedlacek & Brooks, 1970), the Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory 
(Brigham, Woodmansee, & Cook, 1976), and the Attitudes Towards Blacks scale 
(Brigham, 1993). A field study conducted by Platz and Hosch (1988) used only one 
question to assess racial attitudes. Correlations between scores on the explicit racial 
attitudes measures and face memory performance have been found to be non-
significant in every study that employed them (Slone et al., 2000; Platz & Hosch, 
1988; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Lavrakas et al., 1976; Carroo, 1987). 
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It is clear that the use of self-report measures of racial attitudes has not yielded 
results consistent with the findings of Seeleman (1940), but researchers have 
expressed some skepticism about the accuracy of the attitude measures used in their 
experiments. Lavrakas et al. (1976) note that although scores on the Racial Attitudes 
Scale did not relate to other-race face memory, a significant relationship did exist 
between racial attitudes and current cross-racial friendships, which in turn related to 
memory for other-race faces. They conclude: "Concerning the attitudes-towards-
Blacks variable, the paper-and-pencil measure used in this study was found to be 
unrelated to recognition performance, which is contrary to previous findings. 
However, having Black friends, which implies a nonnegative attitude towards Blacks, 
is a variable which relates positively to recognizing Black faces. These results 
suggest that, while attitudes towards Blacks may be an important factor in the 
recognition of Black faces, the questionnaire employed here was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect these effects" (p.480). Other studies that have found a relationship 
between cross-racial friendships and other-race face memory include Carroo (1987) 
and Slone et al. (2000). 
Galper (1973) indirectly tested the effects of racial attitudes on other-race face 
memory by administering a face memory task to White and African American 
students in a Black studies course and White and African American students in a 
psychology course. Intuition suggests that because White students enrolled in a Black 
studies course would have positive attitudes towards African Americans, these 
students should not show the "other-race" effect, while White students in a 
psychology course should. Results confirmed this expectation and Galper concluded 
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that White students who showed interest in African American history and culture 
"respond to the present stimuli (face stimuli), in the present context, in a manner 
indistinguishable from that of Black perceivers, and significantly different from that 
of 'typical' White perceivers" (p.459). 
Although the results of Galper's (1973) experiment lend themselves to 
supporting the hypothesis that racial attitudes play a role in other-race face 
recognition, methodological issues should be addressed. First, Galper did not control 
inspection time during the study phase of the face recognition task. It is entirely 
possible that students interested in African American studies looked at African 
American faces longer than students in the psychology course. If this is the case, then 
the results of Galper's study could easily be attributed to the students in the African 
American studies course having greater opportunity to transfer African American 
faces into long-term memory rather than engaging a more efficient encoding strategy 
than the other White students. Malpass (1981) made this point in a critique of the 
study conducted by Galper. Nevertheless, it could not be said that individuals with 
positive views towards African Americans do not look at African American faces in 
real life situations longer than do individuals with neutral or negative racial attitudes. 
Another weakness in Galper's (1973) experiment was that no direct measure 
of racial attitudes was taken. Although "interest" in African Americans could imply 
positive racial attitudes, it does not guarantee it. It is entirely possible that mere 
exposure to a greater number of African Americans during the course of the semester 
was entirely responsible for the absence of the "other-race" effect. 
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Currently there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that racial attitudes 
play a role in other-race face memory. However, it is possible that the methodology 
employed is responsible for this finding. Researchers have found that interracial 
friendships directly relate to other-race face memory and that positive racial attitudes 
relate to interracial friendships (Lavrakas et al., 1976; Slone et al., 2000). Also, 
Carroo (1987) and Lavrakas et al. have mentioned that the possible insensitivity of 
the measurement tools used in testing the effects of racial attitudes on other-race face 
memory could be responsible for null results. 
Because inspection times during the study phase of a face recognition task are 
generally very brief, measuring explicit racial attitudes might be an inappropriate 
approach to connecting racial attitudes to other-race face recognition (as hypothesized 
by Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, & Sriram., 2001). Explicit measures are reflective and 
allow participants ample time to sort through their thoughts on every item. It is very 
possible that the reflective nature of explicit racial attitudes does not correspond well 
with face-recognition tasks, which may operate quickly and automatically. 
Automatic behaviors that could predict an individual's ability to recognize faces 
might be influenced by automatic or implicit racial attitudes. Furthermore, Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995) criticize explicit racial attitude measures as 
being reactive and prone to interference by socially desirable response biases in 
participants. A more appropriate way to measure racial attitudes in the context of the 
"other-race" effect could be to use methods that measure automatic (or implicit) racial 
attitudes (Ferguson et al.). Improving the methods of ascertaining a participant's 
racial attitudes and determining the relationship between racial attitudes and the 
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"other-race" effect is the general purpose of the project proposed in this paper. A 
detailed account of how this purpose will be fulfilled will follow the literature review. 
Closing Statements on the "Other-Race " Effect 
The review of the research literature on the "other-race" effect makes it clear 
that an asymmetry in memory for own-and other-race faces is a common, but not 
ubiquitous phenomenon. It is also clear that individual differences in experience with 
other-race members or differential facial encoding strategies may determine the 
outcome of a cross-racial identification. A third hypothesis that has not been 
eliminated, but instead presently lacks support, is that racial attitudes affect the ability 
of an individual to remember other-race faces. While future research will 
undoubtedly continue to pursue both the contact hypothesis and the feature selection 
hypothesis, the differential racial attitudes hypothesis has generally been regarded as 
a dead end and has not received much attention recently (with the exception of 
Ferguson et al., 2001). However, the project being proposed in this paper hopes to 
successfully link racial attitudes to the "other-race" effect and if successful, will 
hopefully lead to greater confidence that racial attitudes play a significant role in 
cross-race face recognition. 
Section Two: Measuring Racial Attitudes 
The way in which social scientists conceptualize racial attitudes has become 
more complex over the past twenty years, as have the methods used to measure them. 
The purpose of this section of the proposal is to illustrate what developments have 
taken place, why they took place, and how different measurement techniques have 
been designed to keep up. Four main topics will be addressed: Explicit Racial 
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Attitudes, Implicit Racial Attitudes, Explicit and Implicit Racial Attitudes, and Non-
Prejudice. The goal of this section is to give an overview of the development of 
various theories and racial attitude measurement techniques while attempting to 
provide a basis for the attitude measure to be used in the proposed project. Therefore, 
some of the issues addressed will be done so in a cursory manner while others will be 
examined in depth. 
Explicit Racial Attitudes 
The measurement of explicit racial attitudes has been going on well before the 
term "explict racial attitudes" came into use. To put it simply, explicit racial attitudes 
are those that are deliberated upon in an active and aware manner by the individual 
being asked to report his or her attitudes towards various social groups (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). Typically explicit racial attitude measures have been questionnaires 
(Brigham, 1993; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Sedlacek & Brooks, 1970), 
but researchers have also used situational decision- making tasks in order to assess an 
individual's racial attitudes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
A good example of a questionnaire measuring explicit racial attitudes is the 
Situational Attitude Scale (SAS) developed by Sedlacek and Brooks (1970). This 
questionnaire asks participants to make judgments about how they would feel about 
certain situations in which an African American presence is involved. Situations 
involve an African American family moving next door, an African American man 
raping a woman, an African American selling magazines, African Americans 
loitering on a street corner, an African American becoming engaged to a friend, etc. 
Participants make judgments as to how each situation makes them feel on a scale of 1 
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(happy) to 5 (sad). The participant is allowed to answer each item at his or her own 
pace and is allowed to deliberate about the responses. 
The necessity of updating explicit racial attitude measures to match the racial 
outlook of Whites has been made clear by McConahay (1986), who developed the 
Old Fashioned Racism Scale and the Modern Racism Scale. According to 
McConahay, oldfashioned racism is a negative attitude towards African Americans 
that is based on the assumption that African Americans are inferior in nature to 
Whites and that negative stereotypes about African Americans are well-founded 
inferences. Modern racism is a negative attitude towards African Americans based 
on beliefs that can be justified as being motivated by nonracial topics, such as 
affirmative action. Although modern racists do not endorse old-fashioned racist 
beliefs about African Americans, they do feel that there should be a social distance 
between themselves and African Americans. The old fashioned and modern racism 
scales were developed to measure these contrasting racial outlooks of Whites. 
The Pro- and Anti-Black scales (Katz & Hoss, 1988) and the Attitudes 
Towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993) were also developed as attempts to keep up 
with the racial outlook of Whites. Brigham stressed the importance of keeping 
explicit attitude questionnaires current by stating that "racial attitudes are organized 
around salient content areas or social issues that change over time and may or may 
not differ on other dimensions. It follows that relevant issues and content areas will 
vary with the ebb and flow of racial interactions and the unfolding of social and 
political events" (p. 1933). Therefore it could be said that racial attitude 
questionnaires are not only developed around the need to match the racial outlook of 
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Whites but also important issues related to race. One of the strengths, it seems, of 
racial attitude questionnaires is that they directly establish a link between racial 
attitudes and issues (as can other explicit attitude measures such as situational 
decision-making tasks, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
Despite the apparent strengths of using explicit attitude measures, researchers 
have expressed concern about the validity of participant responses on questionnaires 
(Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998) and in situational 
decision-making tasks (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). The primary concern is that 
individual's responses to explicit measures of racial attitudes may be greatly 
determined by social desirability. Fazio et al. found that responses on Modern 
Racism Scale were highly reactive when an African American experimenter was 
present. Crosby et al. found that responses to decision-making tasks (such as 
deciding to help another person) were influenced by the proximity of an African 
American. Individuals were more likely to help an African American in a face to face 
context, but much less likely to help if the African American was not physically 
present at the time. Crosby et al. state: 
The finding that Whites discriminate more often in situations in which they 
do not have actual contact implies that Whites today hold prejudiced 
attitudes but that they inhibit expression of this prejudice when the 
possibility of negative consequences is great. In the more removed and 
anonymous situations, discrimination is more likely to emerge (p. 549). 
Plant and Devine (1998) propose that the effects of social desirability on 
participant responses to explicit attitude measures are more complex than merely 
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wanting to present yourself in a positive light or avoid negative consequences. In 
their model, two different concerns can affect the way in which an individual 
expresses his or her racial attitudes. The first of these is a genuine concern about 
being someone who holds prejudicial attitudes. Plant and Devine call this concern 
"internal motivation to respond without prejudice." Individuals who are internally 
motivated do not intentionally give misleading responses to explicit attitude 
measures, but in attempting to avoid creating a discrepancy between how they should 
be and how they actually are internally motivated individuals will ignore or suppress 
their negative racial attitudes. The second type of concern is called "external 
motivation to respond without prejudice." Externally motivated individuals are closer 
to the standard conception of social desirability and in addition are motivated by the 
wish to avoid situations that might have negative outcomes. Externally motivated 
individuals do not have a great amount of concern over their actual racial attitudes, 
but are very concerned with making sure that they present themselves in a way that is 
consistent with societies norms. 
Individuals can be both externally and internally motivated, and internally 
motivated because they actually do not hold negative beliefs about African 
Americans. People can also be more or less externally or internally motivated. Plant 
and Devine (1998) developed a measure to detect internally or externally motivated 
response styles to explicit racial attitudes questionnaires that will hopefully be of use 
in controlling for reactivity. 
It is clear, however, that explicit attitude measures have a major weakness in 
that they are sometimes reactive and allow participant prevarication. Therefore, 
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although they are very good at tying together current issues with attitudes, explicit 
attitude measures cannot always be trusted as valid measurement tools. 
Implicit Attitude Measures 
The use of implicit attitude measures in research in the area of "race" has 
come about in large part because of concerns about the veracity of participant 
responses on explicit measures of attitude (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986; Fazio et al., 1995) and the possibility that attitudes could possibly affect 
behavior outside of an individual's awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In 
addition to the concerns just mentioned, Devine (1989) points out that racial prejudice 
may involve multiple levels of processing that explicit measures of racial attitude and 
stereotype endorsement are unable to detect. Implicit attitudes are those that are 
automatically activated by the presence of an attitude object, the individual does not 
deliberately activate or recall implicit attitudes and their initial activation is beyond 
his or her control (Bargh, 1984; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Fazio et al., 1986). Also, 
the origins of implicit attitudes are unknown to the individual at the moment of 
activation (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The use of techniques designed to measure 
implicit racial attitudes has provided evidence in support of several theories regarding 
how prejudice may work in a multifaceted manner (Devine, 1989; Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), and has given researchers new 
confidence in the accuracy of data collected for the purpose of ascertaining a 
participant's attitude towards a particular social group (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
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Fazio et al. (1986) approached the issue of implicit attitudes by using a 
priming procedure to show that an individual's attitude towards an object would be 
activated automatically by the mere presence of an attitude object, without the 
individual exerting control over his or her reactions. Fazio et al. explained that within 
an individual's associative network categories and objects are linked together in a 
hierarchical manner, wherein the activation of a category also leads to a "readiness" 
to activate objects that fall within the category. An example of associative connection 
is if the category of "dog" is activated, a host of dog examples become ready for 
activation. These "dog" objects could be different breeds of dogs or even a memory 
one might have of an experience involving dogs. This "readiness" of object 
activation can influence the amount of time it would take an individual to process a 
subsequently presented object (target object), depending on whether or not the new 
object fell within the same category as the initial object (priming object). If a target 
object falls within the same category as the priming object it will take the individual 
less time to identify the target object than if the target object had been primed by an 
object that fell outside the appropriate category. The speeding up of responses due to 
priming is referred to as "facilitation." If, on the other hand, a target object is 
preceded by a prime within a category having opposing qualities to the target 
category identification will be "inhibited" or prolonged. Fazio et al. showed that the 
associative strength between objects and attitudinal categories was a major 
determinant of response latencies in their priming task. In one of their experiments 
objects that were strongly related to the categories of "good" or "bad" were subject to 
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more facilitation or inhibition than objects that were weakly or unrelated to the 
categories. 
Fazio et al. (1995) related the priming procedure to racial attitudes by 
constructing the Bona Fide Pipeline. The Bona Fide Pipeline is a procedure in which 
in-group and out-group faces are used as primes for target words that have either a 
positive or negative connotation. A participant is required to identify the connotation 
of the target words and reaction time is the dependent variable. Target word 
identification is facilitated if a participant's cognitive representation of the prime 
holds the same connotation as the target word and inhibited if the primes' connotation 
is opposite that of the target. Greater inhibition of response (slower reaction time) to 
positive words when preceded by an out-group prime and higher levels of facilitation 
for negative words when preceded by an out-group prime reflect negative out-group 
attitudes. 
Fazio et al. (1995) state that individuals who hold strong associative 
connections between racially defined objects (White and African American faces) and 
positive or negative categories will display facilitation or inhibition to a greater 
degree than do individuals without strong "race" and "connotation" connections. 
According to Fazio et al. the extent to which an individual holds positive or negative 
racial attitudes at the implicit level is determined by the degree to which the priming 
of a category object by an African American or White face affects response latencies. 
Fazio et al. found that responses obtained from the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure 
showed individual differences in response to racially defined primes and objects 
within connotation categories. Judges rating the quality of the interaction between a 
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White participant and an African American experimenter obtained convergent 
validity for the Bona Fide Pipeline. Participants who showed negative racial attitudes 
on the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure were also judged to have lower quality 
interactions with the African American experimenter. 
The Bona Fide Pipeline's primary purpose was to obtain a measure of racial 
attitudes that was not subject to social desirability effects or internal motivation to 
control prejudice. The pipeline procedure accomplished this goal by testing the 
automatic activation of category-object relationships within an individual's 
associative network, without allowing a participant the time necessary to deliberate 
upon or alter their responses. Furthermore, participants did not need to be aware of 
their racial attitudes to be affected by the priming technique. Also, while completing 
the pipeline procedure participants were given a cover story for each task involved 
that was not related to "race." The cover-story in combination with the ambiguous 
nature of the tasks as regards purpose led very few participants to suspect that the 
pipeline procedure was related to race. 
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) conducted a series of experiments 
designed to test the efficacy of another procedure designed to assess implicit racial 
attitudes. The procedure being tested in these experiments was the Implicit Attitudes 
Test (IAT), a task that requires participants to make categorical judgments about 
racially defined objects and connotation defined objects. Judgments made within the 
IAT are subject to the meaning of keys on a computer keyboard that are positioned 
next to each other, one on the right and one on the left. 
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Throughout the tasks included in the IAT, categorical values (either racial: 
White or Black or connotation: pleasant or unpleasant) are assigned to the keys 
positioned on the right or left. Participants are first instructed to assign names to a 
racial category. Names normally considered as "White names" and names that are 
normally considered "African American names" are presented on the computer 
screen, and the categories "White" and "Black" appear to the right or left of the 
names. Within each task included in the IAT the right or left alignment of category 
indicating words (White, Black, pleasant, unpleasant) does not change. Participants 
respond by placing each name in the proper category by pressing the appropriately 
positioned key on the keyboard. This procedure is repeated in a second task in which 
participants categorize pleasant and unpleasant words. In a third task a racial 
category and a connotation category sharing a right or left position combine the 
categorization of both racially identifiable names and words with meaningful 
connotation. Two more tasks follow, one reversing the right / left position of the race 
categories and the final task reversing right / left position of both race and 
connotation categories. 
The IAT is intended to capture implicit racial attitudes by measuring the time 
required for a participant to place each object presented into the proper category. By 
assigning racial judgments (names) with judgments of connotation (pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) to the same response (right or left) the effects of congruence of categories 
should be reflected by participant response latency. Simply stated, if the right key 
indicates a "pleasant" response and an "African American" response at the same time, 
judgments will slow down for an individual that thinks that "African Americans" are 
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not "pleasant." The right key will take on opposing meanings, therefore the 
participant will take longer to respond than if the right key represented "White" and 
"pleasant." 
Greenwald et al. (1998) found that the IAT did in fact predict evaluations 
according to the congruence of the categories' positions. Responses were slower 
when the negative categories of weapons and insects shared a position with the 
positive categories of flowers and musical instruments than when these positive and 
negative categories shared the same right / left position. Further support for the 
efficacy of the IAT was found in two subsequent experiments in which participants 
responded to racially defined categories and connotation defined categories. 
Like the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure, the IAT measures implicit racial 
attitudes by measuring, through reaction time comparisons, the associative 
connections between positive and negative connotation and racial categories. 
Associative connections made without intention are measured by both methods, and 
therefore it is very likely that participants are not aware of or altering their true 
responses. Therefore, it appears that both the Bona Fide Pipeline and the IAT are 
useful for measuring implicit attitudes as previously defined. 
Dovidio , Kerry, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard (1997) have also used a 
priming procedure to measure implicit racial attitudes, and other researchers (Bargh, 
Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996) have provided evidence to show that even 
attitude objects that are mild in nature show the effect of automatic activation. Thus 
far, there is strong evidence to support the idea that attitudes that are activated 
automatically, without the effort or control of the individual, can influence the 
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judgment of attitude objects. Implicit attitudes are the current topic of much 
upcoming research, as is the utility and limitations of measures used to explore them. 
Explicit and Implicit Attitudes 
So far, it has been shown that while explicit and implicit attitude measures 
have strengths, only explicit attitude measures have been found to have a weakness. 
As mentioned in the review of explicit attitudes, Plant and Devine (1998) have 
pointed out that both internal and external motivation to control prejudice can lead to 
prevarication or inaccuracy in responses obtained by explicit attitude measures. 
Implicit measures have been designed to bypass controlled responses by testing 
automatically activated associations between connotation and racial category. 
Implicit attitude measures are also not dependent on individual evaluations of social 
or political issues, as are explicit measures (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). 
Although connecting racial attitudes to issues is a major strength of explicit measures, 
it is only a strength in expanding their utility and does not contribute to confirming 
the validity of these measures. 
Is it the case then that implicit attitude measures capture the true attitude of 
the individual, and that explicit measures are outdated? Wittenbrink et al. (1997) 
criticize explicit attitude measures by stating "the scales do not assess how 
respondents evaluate African Americans, either absolutely or relative to how they 
evaluate White Americans. Thus, although these attitude questionnaires are 
meaningful for assessing variation among participants in their level of prejudice, they 
cannot reveal in any absolute sense the presence or absence of prejudice" (p.272). 
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Many studies have shown a weak relationship between responses made to 
explicit racial attitude measures and implicit attitude measures (Dovidio et al., 1997; 
Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). The lack of 
a relationship between explicit and implicit attitude measures has led theorists to 
conclude that explicit attitude measures are not useless, but capture a fundamentally 
distinct component of racial attitudes (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio & 
Towles-Schwen, 1999; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). 
Devine (1989) proposes that both explicit and implicit attitudes are at work 
when an individual processes an attitude object. According to the view taken by 
Devine an individual's primary reaction to an attitude object is consistent with the 
stereotypic beliefs that have been ingrained in the individual both by their personal 
social network and by society at large. The knowledge of negative beliefs about 
outgroup members is present in everyone, but the effort that some individuals have 
put forth to provide themselves with information and beliefs counter to stereotypes 
can weaken the association between negative beliefs and a racial category. 
Individuals can also suppress their initial reaction by deliberately altering their 
evaluation of an outgroup. Therefore, the explicit attitude is positive, even if the 
initial reaction to the outgroup was negative. Devine continues by defining 
prejudiced individuals as those who have negative implicit reactions to a racial group 
and deliberately endorse these negative reactions. Non-prejudiced individuals are 
those who may have negative implicit reactions to a racial group, but refuse to 
endorse their negative beliefs. Within the parameters of Devine's proposition, both 
implicit and explicit racial attitudes play a meaningful role. Accordingly, it would 
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not seem that explicit measures of racial attitudes are useless, as proposed by 
Wittenbrink et al. (1997). 
Wilson et al. (2000) contend that both explicit and implicit attitudes can be in 
opposition to each other, but exist simultaneously. According to their model, old and 
new attitudes are both capable of activation. The old well-rehearsed reactions to 
attitude objects become implicit and act automatically. But, new attitudes are 
expressed explicitly and when an individual has the required time, mental capacity, 
and motivation the individual expresses the explicit attitudes. This "dual-attitudes" 
model states that implicit and explicit attitudes are not in conflict, but that because 
they are both accessible, situational variables determine which attitude type becomes 
activated. 
Taking the views of Wilson et al. (2000) and Devine (1989) into account, it 
should be said that both explicit and implicit attitude measures are indispensable to 
models that view racial attitudes as composed of multiple components. Explicit 
measures of attitudes should be viewed as the individual's attitude after deliberation, 
unless there is reason to believe that the person might be prevaricating. If 
prevarication becomes a concern in the use of an explicit attitude measure, then an 
experimenter could employ the Bogus Pipeline procedure developed by Jones and 
Sigall (1971). In the Bogus Pipeline procedure participants are told that they are 
connected to a machine that monitors their emotional reactions to questions and that 
regardless of how they respond the researchers will know their true attitude. The 
machine of course is a farce, but it was found that participants connected to the phony 
machine expressed more negative attitudes than did participants not connected to the 
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machine. Nevertheless, because explicit and implicit attitudes work in different 
ways, selection of which type of attitude to measure should be determined by the 
research question being addressed. 
Non-Prejudice 
Phillips and Ziller (1997) took a novel approach to measuring racial attitudes 
by developing a questionnaire intended to tap into the construct of "non-prejudice." 
Non-prejudice is said to be an orientation of inclusion, where individuals are driven to 
look for the similarities between themselves and others, instead of the differences. 
Individuals that are oriented towards their social world in a direction of non-prejudice 
are not likely to notice racial distinctions between themselves and others, because 
they are concentrating on trying to find the attributes between themselves and others 
that are connective. 
The twenty item questionnaire developed to measure non-prejudice is titled 
the "Universal Orientation Scale" (UOS) in order to express the broad nature of non-
prejudice intended to be captured by the scale. The Universal Orientation Scale was 
not designed to measure racial attitudes directly, and only moderate correlations have 
been found between the scale and explicit measures of racial attitudes. The UOS was 
validated by a number of measures of tendencies towards inclusion and was 
negatively related to Dogmatism (a trait associated with racial prejudice). Positive 
relationships were also found between measures of empathy and Humanitarianism-
Egalitarianism, two traits that are generally associated with low levels of racial 
prejudice. 
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Behavioral validity was found for the UOS as high scoring (high levels of 
non-prejudice) and low scoring (low levels of non-prejudice) individuals were given a 
series of packets that described both Whites and African Americans from which they 
were to select a potential work partner (Phillips & Ziller, 1997). High scorers were 
more accepting in general, showing no preference for race. Low scorers were more 
rigid in their selections and did show more preference for ingroup than outgroup 
when selecting their work partner. In a second experiment high- and low-scorers 
were given a series of photographs of Whites and African Americans and asked to 
rate the photographs on a number of dimensions. High scorers rated African 
Americans as more attractive and more representative of humankind than did low 
scorers. 
The difference between the Universal Orientation Scale and other measures 
designed to measure a positive interracial attitude (e.g., the Pro-Black Scale, Katz & 
Hoss, 1988) is that the UOS is not specifically designed to measure a positive attitude 
towards a specific racial group. In fact, none of the questions on the UOS mention 
race. The purpose of the UOS is to measure a generalized attitude of inclusion 
instead of exclusion and therefore an individual's attitude towards specific racial 
groups was excluded from the scale. Although race is the primary issue addressed by 
the construct of non-prejudice, the measure of a "universal" outlook does not 
necessarily have to be tied to an individual's attitudes for a specific racial group. 
High-scorers on the UOS should be neutral in their attitudes towards specific racial 
groups, instead of prejudiced for or against them. 
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The UOS does seem to tap into the construct of non-prejudice, as was the 
intention of the authors. But further research should be conducted to fully validate 
the scale. Scores on the UOS should be compared to implicit attitudes and actual 
degrees of social interaction with diverse others in respect to Fazio and Towles-
Schwen's (1999) MODE model of behavior. This discussion, of course, is beyond 
the scope of the proposed project and therefore does not warrant further expansion. 
However, the current findings relating to the validity of the UOS suggest that it is a 
useful measure in tapping the construct of non-prejudice, a construct that can prove 
very useful to researchers interested in how attitudes affect behavior. 
Closing Statements on Racial Attitudes 
The above discussion of racial attitudes has attempted to provide examples of 
explicit, implicit, and non-prejudiced while also defining the meaning of these terms. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the approaches taken in the measurement of racial 
attitudes have also been discussed as well as theories relating to how implicit and 
explicit racial attitudes may both determine an individuals reactions to racial 
outgroups. The construct of "non-prejudice" was introduced as a new measure of 
individuals who include, instead of exclude to various degrees. It is hoped that the 
discussion of racial attitudes above will provide the background information 
necessary for the introduction of the project currently being proposed. 
Section Three: The Proposed Project 
Goals and Explanation 
The current project is an attempt to improve on past efforts to link racial 
attitudes to the "other-race" effect. It is not presumed that the contact hypothesis 
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(Chiroro & Valentine, 1995) and feature-selection hypothesis (Levin, 2000) are 
incorrect and that racial attitudes affect cross-race face recognition in a manner 
independent of these explanations. It is, in fact, believed that racial attitudes are only 
one determinant that could affect cross-racial face recognition by acting as a 
mediating or moderating variable between recognition ability and either interracial 
contact or feature selection. However, the current project is not intended to validate 
the contact hypothesis or the feature-selection hypothesis, but instead, is intended to 
work within the confines of these two theories in the application of attitudes to cross-
race face recognition. Therefore, research that has shown that attitudes affect 
behavior relevant to cross-racial identification will be discussed, but at the same time, 
the discussion will not be pinned directly to a specific theory explaining the "other-
race" effect. A further discussion of the findings of Ferguson et al. (2001) will also 
take place. 
Attitudes in general have been found to affect behavior in many ways, but not 
as simply as one might assume. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) provide evidence that 
behavior towards an object or situation is not only determined by one's attitude 
towards the object or situation, but also by one's outcome expectancies and the 
influence of a meaningful reference group's norms of behavior. So why would one 
expect that the attitude a White individual has towards African Americans could be 
predictive of how well the individual can recognize African American faces? 
As both the contact hypothesis and the feature-selection hypothesis explain, 
various behaviors are related to an individual's ability to remember other-race faces. 
So far, the measures of explicit racial attitudes employed in attempts to link attitudes 
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to the "other-race" effect have failed (Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Carroo, 1987; 
Lavrakas et al., 1976; Slone et al., 2000). But, the type of racial attitudes being 
measured in these studies are only predictive of behaviors that are open to both 
expectancy and normative influence. The deliberative process involved in 
completing a measure of explicit racial attitudes has been reviewed and it is clear that 
explicit attitudes are subject to both normative and self-evaluative interference (Plant 
& Devine, 1998). It has also been stated that explicit attitudes may be secondary to 
implicit attitudes, and may not be activated at all if the situation does not allow it 
(Wilson et al., 2000). Bargh and Chartrand (1999) contend that automatic behaviors 
are not only prevalent in daily lives, but actually dictate most of what we do and do 
not do. Is it possible then that the behaviors that would be most predictive of an 
individual's ability to recognize other-race faces are automatic behaviors that are 
greatly influenced by implicit attitudes? 
Bargh (1984) has provided evidence that indicates that most of what we attend 
to in our environment is dictated by automatic processes. Fazio and Dunton (1997) 
have shown that implicit racial attitudes are related to the degree to which an 
individual is automatically drawn to the "race" specifying information in a face, a 
behavior that could interfere with attention to the individualizing information in a 
face. Dovidio et al. (1997; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002) and McConnell 
and Leibold (2001) have inadvertently studied other behaviors relevant to face 
recognition. These researchers found that nonverbal behaviors such as eye contact 
and blinking during an interracial experience are predicted by implicit racial attitudes. 
It is possible that these behaviors also interfere with the quality of information 
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encoded about an other-race face. The findings mentioned above have direct 
implications for research conducted on the "other-race" effect because they point out 
that many behaviors that could impact cross-race face recognition ability are related 
to implicit racial attitudes. 
A recent study conducted in Australia and Singapore attempted to link racial 
attitudes to the "other-race" effect by using an indirect racial attitudes measure 
(Ferguson et al., 2001). Realizing that traditional explicit measures of racial attitudes 
were open to social desirability effects and could measure an attitudinal process that 
is inappropriate for predicting behavior in a task that requires an automatic response, 
Ferguson et al. employed the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure (Fazio et al., 1995) as 
their measure of racial attitudes. Ferguson et al. used White and Chinese faces as 
primes in the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure and in a standard serial presentation face 
recognition task. Results of the study showed that those with high negative and low 
negative racial attitudes as measured by the Bona Fide Pipeline did not differ in 
degrees of face-memory asymmetry; that is, both high and low prejudiced individuals 
showed equal "other-race" effects. 
The findings of Ferguson et al. (2001) are somewhat surprising considering 
evidence found by Dovidio et al. (1997) that priming procedures that measure racial 
attitudes predict nonverbal behavior such as eye-contact and blinking when an 
individual is in the presence of an out-group member. It is possible, however, that 
Ferguson et al. failed to find a difference between high and low prejudiced 
individuals because of methodological problems. One problem is that Ferguson et al. 
used a median split to separate participants into high and low prejudiced groups and 
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then proceeded to look for differences between these groups in face recognition 
asymmetry. The use of a median split in this situation could have allowed very little 
difference to actually exist between high and low prejudiced individuals. One would 
expect to find a nonsignificant result if a great number of individuals between groups 
differed very little in respect to the independent variable (racial attitudes). However, 
Ferguson et al. did conduct a multiple regression analysis that confirmed the finding 
that implicit racial attitudes as measured by the Bona Fide Pipeline did not predict 
face recognition scores for other race faces. But the regression analysis failed to 
control for the possible mediating role that interracial contact may play between 
attitudes and cross-race recognition, therefore the null findings of Ferguson et al. may 
be misleading (Pedhazur, 1997). A second limitation is that participants from 
Singapore did not show greater memory for Chinese faces than for White faces. It is 
possible that the White faces were more discriminable than the Chinese faces. Taking 
these methodological issues into account the results of Ferguson et al. should not be 
taken at face value. 
Another aspect of Ferguson et al. (2001) which requires that additional 
research be conducted on implicit attitudes and cross-race face recognition is that 
their study used participants from outside of the United States. The history behind 
race relations in the United States is quite different from that in Australia. Taking 
historical and societal differences in consideration, it is very possible that racial 
attitudes between Whites and African Americans in the U.S. differ qualitatively from 
those between Asians and Whites in Australia. Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that the racial attitudes of Whites in the U.S. are stronger than those of 
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Whites in Australia, cultural differences could lead to differences in the way that 
racial attitudes are expressed and processed between American and Australian 
Whites. 
The goal of the current project is to link implicit racial attitudes to the "other-
race" effect by using the Fazio et al. Bona Fide Pipeline procedure (1995). Although 
the IAT has been shown to obtain larger effect sizes than priming methods 
(Greenwald et al., 1998) and may be a more sensitive test, the Bona Fide Pipeline has 
a built-in face recognition component that makes it ideal for a study being conducted 
on the "other-race" effect. In addition to the Fazio et al. priming task a short priming 
task will be included in the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure in this experiment. The 
short priming task will be included because of concerns about possible practice 
effects interfering with the measurement of implicit racial attitudes in the Fazio et al. 
priming task. Practice effects are a concern because in the Fazio et al. priming task 
participants are exposed to the same target words on five (or possibly six) different 
occasions. Therefore, decreases in response times could occur as the number of 
exposures a participant has with target words increases. 
The Universal Orientation Scale (Phillips & Ziller, 1997) will be used as an 
additional measure because it is expected that individuals with a predilection for 
looking for similarities between themselves and others will not only maximize their 
social interactions regardless of race, but will be less likely to attend to "race" 
features and concentrate on the individuating features of a face. Higher scorers on the 
UOS are intended to show better recognition of other-race faces. Although Phillips 
and Ziller found no correlation between scores on the UOS and the Marlowe-Crowne 
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Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967), a precaution against the effects 
of social desirable response tendencies should be taken in the current study. The 
questions contained in the UOS intuitively call for such a precaution, because 
answering in a "universal" manner could be highly appealing to individuals 
regardless of their actual level of "Universal Orientation." Therefore, the Marlowe-
Crowne social desirability scale will be used as a control measure for response biases 
on the Universal Orientation Scale. 
Current interracial contact will be measured in accordance with the findings of 
Slone et al. (2000) that indicated that current interracial contact was predictive of 
cross-race face recognition. The purpose of collecting the interracial contact 
information is not to support the contact hypothesis, but instead is to control for the 
effect that contact may have on other-race face recognition. Therefore, contact will 
be a controlled variable in the present study to avoid contamination of the possible 
racial attitudes effects. 
Because little evidence supporting the existence of a relationship between 
explicit racial attitudes and the "other-race" effect has been found it is important to 
show the distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes in relation to the "other-
race" effect. Therefore, the Attitudes Towards Blacks scale (ATB, Brigham, 1993) 
will be used in the current study to directly compare its relationship with cross-racial 
face recognition to the relationship between cross-racial face recognition and implicit 
attitudes. Because individuals may control their responses to items on the ATB in 
order to appear "non-prejudiced," motivation to control prejudiced reactions will be 
measured by the MCPR scale developed by Dunton and Fazio (1997). This scale 
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contains two factors which will be used as separate control variables when correlating 
face recognition scores with ATB scores: (a) a motivation to appear to others and self 
as non-prejudiced and (b) a motivation to avoid conflict with out-group members. 
Therefore this study will investigate three separate hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Implicit racial attitudes as measured by the Bona Fide Pipeline 
(including the short priming task) will be positively correlated with cross-racial face 
recognition after controlling for the effects of contact. 
Hypothesis 2: Universal Orientation Scale scores will be positively correlated 
with cross-racial face recognition after controlling for the effects of social desirability 
and contact. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no relationship between explicit racial attitudes 
and cross-racial face recognition. Motivation to control prejudiced reactions will be a 
controlled variable in the correlation between the ATB (Brigham, 1993) and cross-




Participants were undergraduate students at Western Kentucky University and 
most were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses. Twenty-eight male and 
32 female participants were included in the main study. Because most of the research 
conducted on racial attitudes in the United States has concentrated on Whites' 
attitudes towards blacks, especially research involving implicit racial attitudes, all 
participants recruited for the current study were White in order to avoid possible 
theoretical complications. 
An additional 192 participants completed the interracial contact questionnaire 
and were undergraduate students from Western Kentucky University. 
This study was approved by the Human Subjects Review Board at Western 
Kentucky University. 
Materials, Stimuli, and Apparatus 
Materials. Five questionnaires were used in this experiment (to see 
questionnaires refer to the "Appendices" section of this paper): the Mariowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967), the Universal Orientation Scale 
(Phillips & Ziller, 1997), the Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993), the 
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (Dunton & Fazio, 1997), and an 
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interracial experience questionnaire developed in our own lab. The Social 
Desirability Scale contains 33 items and is intended to measure the degree to which a 
respondent will answer questions in a manner that they think will portray them in a 
positive light, regardless of the veracity of their responses. Items on the Social 
Desirability Scale are personal statements to which a participant responds by 
indicating whether each statement is "true" or "false" for them personally. The 
Universal Orientation Scale (UOS) contains 20 items and is intended to measure the 
degree to which an individual is non-prejudiced in their social outlook. Items on the 
Universal Orientation Scale are personal statements to which a participant responds to 
by indicating on a 5 point Likert-type scale the degree to which they agree that each 
statement describes them (1= does not describe me well, 5= describes me very well). 
The Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale (ATB) contains 20 items and was designed as an 
explicit measure of Whites' attitudes towards African Americans. Items on the 
Attitudes Towards Blacks scale are statements about social distance between the self 
and African Americans, affective responses of the self to African Americans, 
government policies concerning African Americans, and personal worry about losing 
something (e.g., a job) to an African American. Statements are worded in either a 
positive or negative direction and the participant indicates on a scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) the degree to which they endorse each statement. 
The Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR) scale contains 17 items and 
was designed to measure the degree to which an individual is motivated to suppress 
their true feelings, if these feelings: (Factor 1) (a) make the person appear prejudiced 
in the eyes of others, (b) violate personal standards of non-prejudice, and (Factor 2) 
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(c) could instigate a confrontation between the self and an out-group member. Items 
on the MCPR are personal statements that the participant endorses on a scale from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). The interracial experience questionnaire 
contains 18 items and is intended to measure an individual's amount of current cross-
racial interaction as well as collect demographic information. The interracial 
experience questionnaire is based on an early version of the Social Experience 
Questionnaire developed by Brigham (1993) and insights into the role of interracial 
contact on the "other-race" effect stated by Valentine (1995). Items on the interracial 
contact questionnaire are personal statements to which a participant responds by 
placing the numerical value appropriate to each statement. 
Stimuli. The stimuli that were used in the face recognition task and the Bona 
Fide Pipeline (Fazio et al., 1995) were selected from high-school and college 
yearbooks. Most pictures were taken from yearbooks that were both out of state and 
more than seven years old. Pictures were not selected from yearbooks from the 
University at which the experiment took place, because of the chance that some of 
the participants would recognize a stimulus photo. It is highly unlikely that any of the 
faces used in the experiment were familiar to any of the participants. Using Adobe 
Photoshop 5.0 photos of faces were cropped so that the external features of the face 
(hair, ears, outline of face) were not visible. The elimination of the external features 
of the faces was necessary to prevent participants from identifying faces by using 
information that is irrelevant to the experiment. Each face used in the face 
recognition task was seen in a full-frontal pose and brightness and contrast were 
controlled so that the lighting conditions of the photograph would not provide 
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additional information that a participant could use to recognize a face. All faces were 
in black and white. 
In order to create two different sets of faces for the face recognition task, faces 
were randomly assigned to "list one" or "list two." Faces were then designated as 
either target faces (to be seen during the study phase of the face recognition task) or 
distracter faces (to be seen only during the test phase of the face recognition task). 
Target faces and distracter faces were matched according to any distinctive feature 
(e.g., mustache, smiling), so that if a target face that appeared during the study phase 
had a distinctive feature a distracter face would appear at test that had the same 
distinctive feature as the target face. Matching was done in order to eliminate any 
affect that distinctive features could have on recognition scores. 
A visual mask was created for use in the face recognition task. The visual 
mask was a square containing a meaningless pattern of shapes and lines. The visual 
mask was created in Adobe Photoshop 5.0 and was in black and white. 
Faces used as primes in the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure were not in full 
frontal pose, but all other control measures were identical to those used on the face 
recognition task photos. All faces were made identical in size (124 x 161 pixels) in 
Adobe photoshop 5.0, and were cropped in order to eliminate as much non-facial 
information as possible. All faces were in black and white. All faces used as primes 
were displaying positive affect, as it became extremely difficult to find all neutral 
faces. All faces used as primes were matched on the characteristics of attractiveness 
and likability, so that faces in both racial categories did not differ on these 
characteristics. Faces represented four categories: White male, White female, 
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African American male, and African American female. Additional Asian faces were 
included as part of the priming task of the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure. 
A row of asterisks was created for use as a neutral prime in phase 1 and phase 
5 of the Bona Fide Pipeline. The row of asterisks was created in Adobe Photoshop 
5.0, asterisks were black on a white background, and were clearly visible. 
Target words used in the Bona Fide Pipeline were created using Adobe 
Photoshop 5.0. Target word stimuli were written in bold and were large enough to be 
quickly seen and read by participants. Words appeared in black and were surrounded 
by a white background, all words were uniformly positioned in the center of the 
display. During presentation in the Superlab program word stimuli displays were 160 
pixels horizontally and 215 pixels vertically. 
Target words that would be used in the phase four priming task were identical 
to those used in Fazio et al. (1995). Target words used in the phase five priming task 
were selected from Anderson's (1968) list of personality traits and met the criterion 
of falling in the middle range of connotation intensity. Ten words with a positive 
connotation and 10 words with a negative connotation were selected from Anderson's 
list. A study conducted by Dumas, Johnson, and Lynch (2002) confirmed that 
Anderson's (1968) list of adjectives still hold the same connotation intensity that they 
did in 1968. None of the selected words reflect racial stereotypes. 
Apparatus 
The Bona Fide Pipeline procedure was run using an Apple Macintosh G3 
computer. A color monitor was used to present stimuli. The Bona Fide Pipeline 
procedure was created and administered using the Superlab program. 
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Procedure 
Questionnaire Check. To establish the internal structure of the interracial 
contact questionnaire, participants who were not included in the primary experiment 
filled out the questionnaire. All questions included in the contact questionnaire were 
directly derived from questions included in the Social Experience Questionnaire 
devised by Brigham (1993). Participants were given an informed consent form and 
were told that they would be answering a few questions about people that they come 
in contact with in everyday life. If a participant agreed to participate he/she filled out 
the 18 item interracial contact questionnaire. 
Experimental Session. Participants were greeted by a White experimenter and 
given an informed consent form to read and sign. Using instructions similar to those 
used by Fazio et al. (1995), participants were told that the experiment involved a 
study of whether access to word meaning is an automatic skill and that a variety of 
different tasks would be performed during the experiment. This explanation was 
necessary to mask the true nature of the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure. Each phase of 
the Bona Fide Pipeline procedure took place in sequential order. 
At this point it should be mentioned that the order in which events took place 
was carefully planned in order to eliminate the affect that the occurrence of one event 
may have on another (e.g., the ATB being presented before the phase four priming 
task could lead to reactive responses). Therefore, questionnaires that specifically 
dealt with racial attitudes were administered after the priming tasks. 
Phase One Bona Fide Pipeline (Obtaining a baseline for Phase 4 priming task): 
Participants were instructed that they would be making judgments about words. They 
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were told that words would be presented to them on the computer screen and that they 
should indicate the connotation of each word as quickly and accurately as possible by 
pressing the "1" key on the number pad of the keyboard if the word had a positive 
connotation and the "2" key if the word had a negative connotation. They were also 
told that if they made a mistake they could correct it. It was stressed to the 
participants that accuracy was more important than speed, but that they should still 
work as quickly as possible. 
Preceding the presentation of a stimulus adjective, a row of asterisks appeared 
on the screen and remained in view for a period of 315 milliseconds. A blank screen 
(white background devoid of any objects) followed the presentation of the asterisks 
for a period of 135 milliseconds. Following the blank screen an adjective was 
presented. The presentation of the adjective was the final event of a single trial. A 
trial ended after a stimulus adjective had remained on the screen for 1.75 seconds or 
the participant responded. Twenty-four trials were presented on the computer screen, 
adjectives (12 positive connotation, 12 negative connotation) and were distributed 
within a block of twenty-four trials in a random sequential order. A practice block of 
12 trials preceded the actual blocks of trials to familiarize participants with the task. 
Two separate blocks of twenty-four trials each (using the same adjectives, but in 
different random order) immediately followed the practice block of trials. The 
average response latency made to each adjective was calculated by obtaining the 
mean response latency of the two blocks of trials. This average was used as a 
baseline response to each adjective. 
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Questionnaire 1: Between phase one and phase two of the Bona Fide Pipeline 
participants completed the Universal Orientation Scale. 
Phase Two Bona Fide Pipeline (Face recognition task study phase): Phase two began 
with the experimenter explaining to the participant that he/she would now be looking 
at faces and trying to remember them. The participant was then presented forty faces 
in a randomly determined sequential manner (10 White male, 10 White female, 10 
African American male, 10 African American female), these faces were "target" 
faces. Faces presented as targets and distracters were counterbalanced across 
participants as two completely distinct sets of faces were used (list one and list two). 
Each set included 80 faces (both target and distracter faces) and were counterbalanced 
across participants. Faces were presented on the computer monitor for 3 seconds 
each and were separated by a visual mask (a meaningless visual pattern necessary to 
disrupt the visual trace of a face) that remained on the screen for 1 second. There was 
no delay between phase two and phase three. 
Phase Three Bona Fide Pipeline (Face recognition task test phase): Phase three began 
with the experimenter informing the participant that he/she would be using the 
computer again. After the participant was positioned in front of the computer monitor 
the experimenter informed the participant that the faces that they just saw would be 
presented again, but that this time new faces that were not seen will be mixed in with 
the old faces. Participants were instructed to hit the "y" key on the keyboard if the 
face that they see is an old face that they have seen before and to hit the "n" key on 
the keyboard if the face is new or had not been seen before. The participants were 
then presented with 80 faces in a randomly determined sequential manner. The forty 
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target faces were included along with 40 new distracter faces (each category of face 
was represented with 10 new distracter faces). Each face remained on the screen until 
the participant responded and the visual mask again separated each face. Both 
response latencies and "y" or "n" responses were recorded for each face.1 
Questionnaire Two: Between the third and fourth phase of the Bona Fide Pipeline 
participants completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. 
Phase Four Bona Fide Pipeline (priming task developed by Fazio et al., 1995): Phase 
four began with the experimenter telling the participant that he/she will now be asked 
to both make word judgments and remember faces at the same time. Participants 
were further instructed to remember to make word judgments as quickly and 
accurately as possible. 
Phase four was identical to phase one, except that faces not used previously in 
the recognition tasks replaced the row of asterisks. The timing within and between 
trials remained identical to that in phase one. Both male and female faces were used 
and were White, African American, or Asian. Asian faces were used to preclude 
participant suspicion of the task. 
Four blocks containing 48 trials each were included in phase four. Within 
each block, 48 photographs were used representing each of the race and sex 
categories. Six photographs represented each category, except that there were 12 
White faces used for both sex categories, 12 White male/female faces matched with 
Asian and African American male/female faces. Each face was viewed only once 
within each block and was used as a prime for only one of the 24 adjectives (each 
1
 (Note: Phase two and three differ from Fazio et al. (1995) in that the detailed aspects, viz., Presentation time; ITI; delay; of 
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adjective was presented twice in each block, primed by a White and Asian or African 
American face). Over the course of the four blocks each face was used as a prime for 
2 positive and 2 negative adjectives. White and African American faces, as well as 
White and Asian faces (same sex), were matched as to the adjectives that they 
primed, so that each adjective was primed by a face from all racial categories. Within 
the course of the priming task 24 White faces, 12 African American faces, and 12 
Asian faces were used. Only the trials involving African American and White face 
primes were considered for the analysis, because the trials involving Asian face 
primes were only included to bolster the cover story. 
Questionnaire Three: Between phases four and five participants completed the 18 
item Interracial Contact Questionnaire. 
Phase Five Bona Fide Pipeline (short priming task): Phase five served as an alternate 
measure of automatic racial attitudes. Because the Bona Fide Pipeline presents the 
same adjective several times over the course of phase one and phase four, reaction 
times to the adjectives may decrease as a function of practice, thereby reducing the 
effect that a face prime may have on reaction times by increasing facilitation and 
reducing inhibition. Phase five obtained baselines and reactions to primes in a single 
block of trials, eliminating any effects that practice could have on reaction times. 
Participants were assigned to one of five priming conditions and assignment 
to each condition was counterbalanced. The same 20 target words were used in each 
of the five conditions (10 words with a positive connotation and 10 words with a 
negative connotation), and these target words were not used in any of the prior tasks. 
the phases are unique to the current experiment and are based on past research on face recognition) 
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Eight face primes (2 faces representing male/female and White/African American 
categories) were used in each condition along with the row of asterisks used in phase 
one. Face primes were selected from those used in phase 4 and were matched so that 
all faces were equal in the characteristics of attractiveness and likability. The row of 
asterisks used in phase 1 was used as a neutral prime. 
Within each of the five conditions each prime (face or asterisks) was matched 
with a positive and a negative target word. Each condition consisted of twenty 
prime/target word presentations or trials. Across the five conditions each target word 
was matched with each face prime and the row of asterisks. Participants were 
required to press the 1 key on the number pad if the target word had a positive 
connotation and the 2 key on the number pad if the target word had a negative 
connotation. Phase five was identical to phase four in the timing of the prime, the 
inter-stimulus interval, the target word, and the inter-trial interval. Response latencies 
to the adjectives again served as the dependent variable. 
Questionnaire Four: Between phases five and six participants completed the Attitudes 
Towards Blacks scale. 
Phase Six Bona Fide Pipeline (recognition task of the face primes used in phases 4 
and 5): Phase six was a face recognition task identical to phase three, except that the 
White and African American faces that were paired together and used as primes in 
phases four and five were used as target faces (24 target faces). Distracter faces (24 
total, 6 representing each racial/sex category) were completely novel. Therefore, 
there was a total of 48 decisions made in phase six. Phase six was included to insure 
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that the participants were attending to the faces used as primes in phases four and 
five. 
Questionnaire Five: Following phase six participants completed the Motivation to 
Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale. Following the completion of this questionnaire 
each participant was debriefed and thanked for his/her participation. 
Results 
In the following section manipulation checks and descriptive statistics for all 
questionnaires and priming tasks will precede the results from the 3 hypothesis tests. 
The alpha level for all analyses is set at/? < .05. 
Manipulation Checks 
Interracial Contact Questionnaire Check. Before running the main 
experiment an additional study was conducted to determine the internal structure of 
the interracial contact questionnaire. A separate sample of 192 responses was 
collected to accomplish this goal. Although the interracial contact questionnaire is 
intended to measure only "current cross-racial interaction," it is possible that it taps 
into more than this construct. One possible deviation from the intended one factor 
structure of the questionnaire is a two factor "intimate" vs. "non-intimate" structure 
because some of the questions ask about interaction at differing levels of intimacy 
(e.g., I have dated African Americans in the past 2 years vs. On a typical day I 
talk to African Americans on campus). Responses to the contact questionnaire 
were put into a principle components analysis with an orthogonal Varimax rotation 
with a Kaiser Normalization. Cases were excluded listwise, excluding 28 cases, 
leaving 164 cases for analysis. A scree plot and Eigenvalues over 1 were used to 
determine the number of factors within the interracial contact questionnaire. 
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Although four components emerged as having eigenvalues over 1, the eigenvalue of 
the first component was 7.465, whereas none of the other components had 
eigenvalues over 2. Analysis of the scree plot indicated one main component (the 
first one), with weak components being present. The first component accounted for 
41.470 % of the total variance, whereas none of the three other components 
accounted for more than 11 % of the total variance. These results indicate that there 
is in actuality only one component to the interracial contact questionnaire. Taking 
this information into account it is thought that the questionnaire follows the same 
internal structure of Brigham's (1993) "current contacts" factor of the Social 
Experience Questionnaire. This was, in fact, the goal of the interracial contact 
questionnaire. 
Participant Attention to Primes in the Main Experiment. In order to confirm 
that participants were paying attention to the face primes during the Bona Fide 
Pipeline procedure responses to phase six of the procedure were transformed into d' 
values. A one sample t-test (testing against zero, or chance performance on the 
recognition task) confirmed that participants were attending to the face primes (M= 
.8197, SD = .4476), t (59) = 14.185,p< .001 (two-tailed). 
Questionnaires in the Main Experiment 
Universal Orientation Scale (UOS). Scores on the Universal Orientation 
Scale (Phillips & Ziller, 1997) were obtained by averaging the 20 responses made by 
each participant after reverse scoring the necessary items. Each response was made 
on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1-5. Higher scores indicated a more "universal" 
orientation. The mean score was 3.47, standard deviation was .4246, and the range 
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was 2 with a minimum value of 2.5 and a maximum value of 4.5. The mean score 
from Phillips and Ziller (1997) was 3.44 and the standard deviation was .47. 
Coefficient Alpha for the UOS in the current study was .7579. 
Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS). Scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967) were obtained by scoring responses 
made in the socially desirable direction as a 1 and responses not in the socially 
desirable direction as a 0. Scores on the 33 items were summed to obtain an overall 
score for each participant. Higher scores indicated a higher socially desirable 
response bias. The mean score was 14.89, standard deviation was 4.96, and the range 
was 22 with a minimum value of 2 and a maximum value of 24. The mean score 
from a recently published study that used the MCSDS was 17.91 with a standard 
deviation of 6.60 (Wilkerson, Nagao, & Martin, 2002). 
Interracial Contact Questionnaire (ICQ). Answers to the interracial contact 
questionnaire were summed to obtain a single value for each participant (Slone et al., 
2000). Although the questionnaire was originally designed as open-ended, responses 
of nine or greater (for each item) were transformed to conform to Brigham's original 
questionnaire, which capped answers at nine or above. 
Coefficient Alpha was computed in order to ensure that the transformation of 
the 18-item Interracial Contact Questionnaire from an open-ended format to having 
responses capped at 9 did not interfere with the one factor structure of the 
questionnaire. Because a satisfactory alpha level (.7723) was obtained in this analysis 
the transformations were retained for the computation of overall scores on the 
Interracial Contact Questionnaire. 
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In order to get a pure measure of contact with African Americans, only 
questions referring to current contact with African Americans were included for later 
analysis. The final number of items included was 12. Coefficient Alpha was 
computed and results indicated that the internal reliability of the new sub-scale was 
reasonable (alpha = .7228). 
Overall scores on the Interracial Contact Questionnaire were obtained by 
summing responses to each item. Higher scores indicated more contact with African 
Americans. The mean score was 33.18, standard deviation was 13.11, and the range 
was 57 with a minimum value of 5 and a maximum value of 62. The mean score 
from Brigham (1993) was 35.73, standard deviation was not reported. 
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPR). The Motivation 
to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale consists of two separate factors (Dunton & 
Fazio, 1997). Factor one includes items that tap an individual's concern with 
violating personal standards of non-prejudice and being seen as prejudiced in the eyes 
of others. Factor one made up an independent scale that consisted of 11 items and 
was referred to as "concern for acting in a prejudiced manner" (CAPM). Factor two 
included 6 items that tap an individual's concern with offending or causing a conflict 
between themselves and others (including others of a different race). Factor two 
made up an independent scale that was referred to as "motivation to avoid conflict" 
(MAC). 
Overall scores on each scale were obtained by averaging the responses to each 
item, reverse scoring responses when necessary. Responses were made on a 1-7 
Likert- type scale for both scales (which were administered as a single questionnaire) 
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and higher overall scores reflect a higher tendency to control prejudiced responses. 
The mean score for the "concern for acting in a prejudiced manner" scale was 4.87, 
standard deviation was .7829, and the range was 3 with a minimum value of 3.45 and 
a maximum value of 6.45. The mean score for the "motivation to avoid conflict" 
scale was 4.16, standard deviation was .8375, and the range was 3.67 with a 
minimum value of 2.17 and a maximum value of 5.83. To the knowledge of the 
current author the mean scores and standard deviations from studies using the MCPR 
have not been reported. 
Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale (ATB). Overall scores on the Attitudes 
Towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993) were obtained by averaging the responses 
after reverse scoring the necessary items. Responses were made on a 1 -7 Likert-type 
scale, and higher overall scores indicate positive attitudes towards African 
Americans. The mean score was 5.37, standard deviation was .8216, and the range 
was 3.55, with a minimum value of 3.05 and a maximum value of 6.60. Item means 
were computed and summed for comparison to Brigham. In the current study the 
sum of item means was 107.51. Brigham reported the sum of item means as 89.66. 
The sum of item standard deviations in the current study was 31.48. Brigham 
reported a sum of item standard deviations of 17.30. 
Intercorrelations between Questionnaires. Because all of the main 
hypotheses of this study involve using questionnaires as predictor variables and 
control variables it was important to determine any relevant relationships between the 
questionnaires. A correlation matrix was obtained using a Pearson zero order 
correlation between the UOS scores, MCSDS scores, the two factors of the MCPR, 
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ATB scores, and the ICQ scores (see table 1). The Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale 
correlated positively with the UOS (r = .516,/? <.001), positively with the "concern 
for acting in a prejudiced manner" scale of the MCPR (r = .41 \,p = .001), meaning 
that as scores increased on the ATB they also increased on the UOS and MCPR. The 
ATB related to a nonsignificant degree in a negative direction with the "motivation to 
avoid conflict" scale of the MCPR (r = -.232, p = .074), and to a non-significant 
degree in a positive direction with the ICQ score (r = .230, p = .077). The ICQ 
correlated negatively with the "concern for acting in a prejudiced manner" scale of 
the MCPR (r = -.292, p = .024), so as scores increased on the ICQ they decreased on 
the CAPM scale. No other significant correlations were obtained. Because of its lack 
of relation to any of the independent variables the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale scores were dropped from all further analyses. The MCPR scales 
were retained as control measures for further analysis concerning the ATB Scale as 
was the ICQ. Because of the strong relationship found between the ATB and the 
UOS, both of these scales would serve as controls to each other in later correlational 
analyses. 
Because the ATB scores and the ICQ scores correlated with the two subscales 
of the MCPR, and the ATB scores correlated with the UOS scores, a partial 
correlation was performed to determine what relationships existed between the ATB, 
the UOS, and the ICQ after controlling for both of the MCPR subscales. After 
controlling for the MCPR subscales the ATB scores correlated with the UOS scores 
(r = 5036, p < .01) and the ICQ scores (r = .3918,p = .003). The UOS scores 
correlated with the ICQ scores to a significant degree (r = .2606, p =.05). 
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Table 1 
Zero- Order Correlations between Questionnaire Scores 
UOS MCSDS MCPR (CAPM) MCPR (MAC) ATB ICQ 
UOS 1.00 .183 .212 -.131 .516** .195 
MCSDS 1.00 .307* -.052 .173 -.020 
MCPR (CAPM) 1.00 -.328** .411** -.292* 
MCPR (MAC) 1.00 -.232 .101 
ATB 1.00 .230 
*p < .05 **p < .01 
Automatic Preference Scores 
Bona Fide Pipeline. To obtain a single number that represented an 
individual's automatic attitude towards African Americans in relation to Whites 
"automatic preference scores" were calculated. Initial treatment of reaction times 
followed that of Fazio et al. (1995) and consisted of creating facilitation and 
inhibition scores from reaction times to all trials in phase four of the Bona Fide 
Pipeline. First, the two reaction times to each word presented in phase one of the 
Bona Fide Pipeline were averaged in order to obtain a baseline response latency for 
each word. The reaction times to the first twelve trials were removed because they 
served as "warm up" trials for the participants, as were all errors. Baseline scores 
were calculated individually from the data from each participant. After removing the 
data from all trials involving Asian faces, baseline reaction times for each word were 
subtracted from reaction times to primed words (which were the same words as the 
baseline words) that were presented in phase four, producing the initial facilitation or 
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inhibition scores. All errors were removed for two reasons: (a) no participant had a 
substantial number of errors (average errors equaled 3.7% of total responses), and (b) 
the meaning of errors and reaction times of errors was ambiguous. Next, because 
each face served as a prime four times across the four blocks of trials in phase four 
(twice priming negative words, and twice priming positive words), two averages of 
the initial facilitation or inhibition scores were calculated for each face, one when the 
face primed positive words and one when the face primed negative words. Then the 
averages for each face were averaged according to their classification within race, 
sex, and the connotation of the words that they primed. This produced facilitation or 
inhibition scores for African American and White, male and female faces, when they 
served as primes to positive and negative words. Leading to eight different scores (to 
see average inhibition and facilitation scores by race, see table 2). In order to obtain a 
measure of "preference" that could be later used for comparison with performance on 
a face recognition task, one number was obtained by first subtracting facilitation or 
inhibition scores from positive words from facilitation or inhibition scores obtained 
from negative words. Subtracting these scores produced a single number for each 
type of face prime that reflected the overall reaction of the participant (both positive 
and negative reaction) to each type of face. Because we were interested only in the 
effects of "race," scores were then averaged across sex of prime. Finally in order to 
obtain a number that reflected an individual's attitude towards African Americans in 
relation to Whites, White scores were subtracted from African American scores. 
Therefore, higher numbers reflected positive attitudes towards African Americans and 
lower numbers reflected negative attitudes. The mean preference score for data from 
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60 participants was -5.1328, standard deviation was 69.14, and the range was 360 
with a minimum value of-238.69 and a maximum value of 121.83. Skew was -.880 
with a standard error of .309. 
Table 2 
Mean inhibition and facilitation scores for trials involving African American 
and White face primes in Phase 4 priming task. 
Negative Adj. Positive Adj. 
African American face primes 18.96 26.60 
White face primes 14.98 18.93 
NOTE: Positive values reflect inhibition, as scores increase so does inhibition following a face prime. 
Phase Five Shortened Priming Task. In order to compute preference scores 
from the reaction times obtained in phase five, initial reaction times were averaged 
according to connotation of adjective and status of prime (African American male, 
African American Female, White male, White female, or row of asterisks baseline) 
after all errors were removed (average errors equaled 3.5% of total responses). Next, 
average baseline reaction times were subtracted from average reaction times from 
each of the primed trial types (e.g. African American female prime). Subtraction of 
baseline reaction times from primed trial reaction times was matched on connotation 
of adjective, meaning that only negative baselines were subtracted from primed 
negative words and positive baselines from primed positive words. Reaction times 
were now facilitation or inhibition scores for eight categories representing the four 
categories of faces (African American male and female, White male and female) and 
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two connotation types (Positive and Negative). Finally, from these eight facilitation 
or inhibition scores "preference" scores were computed for each participant in the 
same way that the phase four data was transformed from inhibition or facilitation 
scores to "preference" scores. Higher scores reflect a preference for African 
Americans and lower scores reflect a preference for Whites. The mean preference 
score was 6.31, standard deviation was 223.46, and range was 1242.25 with a 
minimum value of -522.75 and a maximum value of 719.50. Data from two 
participants did not include scores from one of the categories of inhibition or 
facilitation data, so were excluded from all analyses involving preference scores. 
Skew was .550 with a standard error of .314. 
Relationships between Automatic Preference Scores and Questionnaires. 
Because both sets of preference scores and the questionnaires would later be used as 
independent variables it was necessary to determine how these measures related to 
each other. First, a Pearson zero order correlation was used to determine what 
relationships existed between the phase four preference scores and the questionnaires. 
The preference scores obtained from phase four of the Bona Fide Pipeline correlated 
to a significant level with the UOS scores (r = .302, p = .019). However, because the 
ATB, ICQ, and the UOS correlated after controlling for the MCPR subscales a partial 
correlation was computed between the ATB, ICQ, UOS, and the phase four 
preference scores, controlling for the MCPR subscales. The results of the partial 
correlation showed that significant positive relationships existed between the phase 
four preference scores and both ATB (r = .2889,p = .031) and UOS scores (r = 
.3404,/? = .010) after controlling for motivation to control prejudiced reactions (both 
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subscales). However, the phase four preference scores did not correlate with the ICQ 
scores (r = .0048, p = .972). The possibility of relationships existing between 
preference scores from the phase five short priming task and the explicit measures 
was also analyzed by computation of Pearson zero order and partial (controlling for 
the MCPR subscales) correlations. No correlations between the preference scores 
from the short priming task and the explicit measures approached significance. A 
partial correlation controlling for UOS scores and ATB scores was computed to 
examine the relationship between the two sets of preference scores, however no 
relationship was found (r = .0400, p = .770). 
D' values from Face Recognition Task 
Obtaining the "Other-Race " Effect and Checking for Stimulus Effects. 
Separate d' values were computed for each participant's performance on White and 
African American faces (see table 3 for mean hits, misses, false alarms, and correct 
rejections for White and African American faces). In order to determine whether 
particular stimulus items or the sex of the participant influenced performance a 2 
(race of face) x 2 (list) x 2 (sex of participant) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted using d' values as the dependent variable, race of face as a within subjects 
factor, and list and sex of participant as between subjects factors. A second reason 
for conducting the repeated measures ANOVA was to make sure that the "other-race" 
effect was demonstrated with the sample of faces used in this study. A significant 
"other-race" effect was demonstrated, F ( l , 56) = 14.813,/? < .001 (White faces M= 
1.1802, SD = .5832, African American faces M= .8497, SD = .5237), and no 
interactions were found between race and the two between subjects factors. The 
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absence of interactions between race and sex of participant and the list from which 
the target and distracter faces were taken for each participant suggest that stimulus 
effects did not account for the results of the face recognition task. 
Because the "other-race" effect was demonstrated, a difference score between 
White and African American faces was computed by subtracting d' for White faces 
from d' for African American faces for each participant. The purpose of subtracting 
d' scores was to get a single metric that represented the degree to which an individual 
was "better" at remembering White or African American faces. Higher scores 
represented better memory for African American faces and lower scores represented 
better memory for White faces. The mean of the difference scores was -.3305 and the 
standard deviation was .6512. 
Table 3 
Mean hits, misses, false alarms, and correct 
rejections for White and African American 
faces in phase 3 face recognition test. 
HITS MISSES F CR 
AA 13.4 6.6 7.45 12.55 
White 12.5 7.46 4.66 15.33 
NOTE: FA = false alarms, CR = correct rejections, AA = African American faces, and White = White faces 
Relationship between d' values, difference scores, and the ICQ. In order to 
determine whether interracial contact would be a controlled variable in later 
correlational analyses between the predictor variables and the face recognition scores, 
a set of partial correlations were obtained between scores on the ICQ, d' for White 
faces, d' for African American faces, and the difference scores, controlling for the 
"motivation to avoid conflict," ATB scores, and UOS scores which correlated with 
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the ICQ in an earlier analysis. No relationship was found between any of the d' 
values or their difference scores and the ICQ. In order to test for a non-linear 
relationship between interracial contact and d' scores for White and African 
American faces, overall scores from the ICQ were broken into high contact, medium 
contact, and low contact groups (n = 20, for each group). A 2 (race of face, within 
subjects factor) x 3 (group, between subjects factor) repeated measures ANOVA 
yielded a significant main effect of race, F (1,57) = 15.064,p < .001, but no 
interaction between race of face and group was found, F (2,57) = .255, p = .776. 
Therefore, the ICQ scores were not controlled for in later hypothesis testing when 
appropriate. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One: Implicit racial attitudes as measured by the Bona Fide 
Pipeline will be positively correlated with cross-racial face recognition, after 
controlling for ATB scores and UOS scores in analysis ofphase four preference data. 
Because scores from the ICQ did not correlate with either the dependent or 
independent variables used in testing hypothesis one, contact was not controlled in 
the analyses used to test hypothesis one. First, a partial correlation controlling for 
Universal Orientation (UOS) and explicit attitudes towards African Americans (ATB) 
was conducted between preference scores from phase four of the Bona Fide Pipeline 
and difference scores computed from the d' values. No relationship was found 
between implicit (automatic) racial attitudes and degree of asymmetry of face 
recognition between races (r = .0998,p = .456). In order to check for a non-linear 
relationship between preference scores and d ' scores for White and African American 
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faces, preference scores were broken into high, medium, and low groups according to 
their scores. Each group consisted of twenty difference scores. A 2 (Race of Face) x 
3 (High, Medium, or Low Group) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using 
race of face as a within subjects factor and group as a between subjects factor. 
Although White faces were remembered better than African American faces, F (1,57) 
= 14.951 ,p <.001, no interaction with group was found F (2,57) = .038,p = .963. 
Figure 1 
Plot of Phase 5 preference scores x difference scores. 
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phase 5 preference scores 
In order to test the relationship between the preference scores from the short 
priming task (completed by participants in phase five of the Bona Fide Pipeline) and 
the difference scores, a Pearson zero-order correlation was computed (see figure 1 for 
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plot of scores). A linear relationship between preference scores and difference scores 
was found (r = .307, p — .019). Because a linear relationship between automatic 
racial attitudes and face memory was found no ANOVA's were performed using the 
preference scores from the short priming task. 
Hypothesis Two: Universal Orientation Scale scores will be positively 
correlated with cross-racial face recognition after controlling for the effects of 
Attitudes Towards Blacks, Interracial Contact Questionnaire Scores, and phase four 
preference scores. Because the scores on the Universal Orientation Scale were found 
to be highly correlated with the scores on the Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale, phase 
four implicit preference scores and the ICQ scores, these scores were statistically 
controlled in the computation of a partial correlation between Universal Orientation 
and face recognition difference scores. Despite controlling for automatic racial 
attitude scores from the phase four task and reported attitudes towards Blacks no 
relationship was found between Universal Orientation score and difference scores (r 
= .0045, p = .973). A 2 (race of face) x 3 (group) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed after the scores on the UOS had been broken into high, medium, and low 
groups (n - 20 for all groups). Values of d' on African American and White faces 
again served as a within subjects factor and group served as the between subjects 
factor. A main effect of race was found, F (1, 57) = 15.866,/? < .001, but the 
interaction between group and race of face did not reach a significant level F (2,57) = 
369, p = All. 
Hypothesis Three: There will be no relationship between explicit racial attitudes and 
cross-racial face recognition. Motivation to control prejudiced reactions (both 
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subscales), UOS scores, ICQ scores, and phase four preference scores will be 
controlled variables in the correlation between the ATB (Brigham, 1993) and cross-
racial face recognition scores. In order to test hypothesis three a partial correlation 
was conducted on the difference scores and the scores on the ATB scale, controlling 
for relevant variables (the preference scores from phase four of the Bona Fide 
Pipeline, Univeral Orientation scores, concern for acting in a prejudiced manner 
scores MCPR, motivation to avoid conflict scores MCPR, and ICQ scores). The 
partial correlation between the difference scores from the face recognition task and 
the ATB scores did not reveal a relationship between the two variables (r = .0798, p = 
.562). Scores on the ATB were broken into high, medium, and low groups (n = 20 
for each group) and a 2 (race of face, within subjects factor) x 3 (group, between 
subjects factor) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to check for a non-linear 
relationship between explicit attitudes and d' values. A significant main effect of race 
was found, F (1,57) = 16.267,/? < .001, and a nonsignificant interaction between race 
of face and group was found, F (2,57) = 2.551 ,p = .087. 
DISCUSSION 
The main goal of the present study was to test three separate hypotheses: a) 
Implicit racial attitudes would be related to the "other-race" effect, b) Level of 
Universal Orientation would be related to the "other-race" effect, and c) Racial 
attitudes reported by individuals on explicit measures would not relate to the "other-
race" effect. Each hypothesis was tested individually, using data collected from 
participants who completed several tasks during a single experimental session. 
Although the first and third hypotheses were confirmed, the second hypothesis was 
not. The following discussion will address the findings in relation to each hypothesis, 
the implications of the findings regarding each hypothesis, some considerations to 
take into account about this experiment, and future directions for conducting research 
involving racial attitudes and memory for other-race faces. 
The first hypothesis, that implicit racial attitudes would be related to the 
"other-race" effect, was tested using a priming task developed by Fazio et al. (1995) 
(phase four, Bona Fide Pipeline) and another, shorter, priming task developed 
specifically for the current study (phase five, Bona Fide Pipeline). The results from 
the correlation between the preference scores obtained from Fazio et al.'s priming 
task and face recognition accuracy indicated that no relationship existed between 
implicit racial attitudes and the "other-race" effect. However, preference scores from 
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the shorter priming task did significantly correlate with the face recognition scores, as 
people who showed a greater level of implicit preference for African Americans 
remembered African American faces better than White faces. 
One explanation for this finding is that because of the length of the phase four 
priming task, participants who may have shown a preference for White or African 
Americans at an automatic level at first became better at making word judgments. 
Therefore, these subjects could have produced attenuated preference scores because 
all responses were made at an increased rate. This explanation does not, however, 
explain why scores on the phase four priming task correlated so highly with the 
Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale scores and the Universal Orientation Scale scores. 
The absence of a correlation between the phase four and phase five priming tasks 
makes interpreting these results even more difficult. However, it is possible 
(considering the pattern of results) that during the course of the lengthy phase four 
priming task participants began to respond less automatically, because over time their 
responses became influenced by controlled processes. This explanation works well 
within the framework of the dual attitudes model (Wilson et al., 2001), wherein two 
independent attitudes (an original attitude and a newer attitude) towards an object or 
class of people can exist at the same time. According to the dual attitudes model the 
original (or well established) attitude becomes activated in situations where an 
individual is caught off guard or is under time pressure (as participants possibly were 
in the first block of the phase four priming task and the short phase five priming task). 
However, when the newer attitude becomes activated (because of time allowances or 
"no stress" conditions), controlled processes begin to influence responses. It is very 
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possible, considering the relationship found between the phase four data, the ATB 
scores, and the UOS scores, that due to the length and repetitive nature of the phase 
four priming task that after the first block of trials controlled processes (the newer 
attitude) began to direct responses, reflecting explicit attitudes. However, the phase 
five short priming task, by using new words and only having one block of trials, did 
not give controlled processes a chance to become activated and thereby captured 
individuals' implicit attitudes. 
The findings of the current study may differ from those of Ferguson et al. 
(2001), who found no relationship between both implicit and explicit racial attitudes 
and the "other-race" effect, for two reasons. First, Ferguson et al. performed a 
median split when they analyzed the phase four priming data in relation to the face 
recognition scores. If an attenuation of scores occurred because of the length of the 
priming task, a median split (allowing in scores very close to the mean in both the 
high and low attitude groups) would exacerbate the situation and lead to a null result. 
However, Ferguson et al. (2001) also found that attitude measures (both 
implicit as measured by the Bona Fide Pipeline phase four and explicit questionnaire 
measures) did not predict face recognition scores in a multiple regression analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, the null result found in the Ferguson et al. regression analysis 
could have been failure to control for the mediating role of interracial contact. But, 
because a significant relationship between implicit racial attitudes and the "other-
race" effect was found in the current study without controlling for interracial contact, 
the argument made earlier concerning the Ferguson et al. regression analysis no 
longer holds. In fact it should be emphasized that the results of the analyses 
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involving our phase four preference scores and those collected by Ferguson et al. 
(which were identical measures of implicit attitudes) produced the same results. 
Unlike the present study, however, Ferguson et al. failed to find a relationship 
between the Bona Fide Pipeline phase four scores and scores from the explicit 
attitude measures. However, it should be mentioned that motivation to control 
prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997) was an uncontrolled variable in the 
Ferguson et al. study. In the present study no relationship was found between implicit 
and explicit measures until scores on the MCPR subscales were controlled. Therefore, 
the null relationship between the explicit and implicit measures as reported by 
Ferguson et al. is not surprising. 
It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the discrepancy between the results of 
the current study and those of Ferguson et al. (2001) exist because of differences in 
the methods used to measure implicit attitudes. The phase five priming task, because 
of its brevity and use of novel target words, measures implicit attitudes, which relate 
to the recognition of other-race faces, but not to explicit measures of racial attitudes. 
The phase four priming task, because of its length and repetitive nature, allows for the 
activation of controlled processes. The activation of controlled processes allows 
attitude scores from phase four to relate to explicit attitude measures, but not to 
automatic behaviors such as the encoding of visual information about faces. At this 
point it should be noted that implicit attitude measures such as scores from the Bona 
Fide Pipeline have correlated with explicit measures in the past (Fazio et al., 1995). 
Also, McConnell and Leibold (2000) found a positive correlation between explicit 
attitude scores and scores on the IAT. It is possible that the congruence of explicit 
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and implicit attitude scores is contingent on both the sample used in the experiment 
and the method of measurement. 
The finding that implicit racial attitudes measured by the phase five priming 
task correlate with the face recognition difference scores suggests that at some level, 
implicit attitudes affect face recognition. It is possible that either the feature selection 
hypothesis or the contact hypothesis (or both) are correct and that implicit attitudes 
somehow interact within these two hypotheses to influence the asymmetry between 
an individual's memory for same- and other-race faces. It is not the goal of this study 
to address these issues, but to show that at some level implicit racial attitudes play a 
role in cross-race face recognition. 
Hypothesis two was tested by correlating the Universal Orientation Scale data 
with the face recognition difference scores. No relationship was found, and therefore 
the possibility of a non-linear relationship between universal orientation and face 
recognition was tested using a repeated measures ANOVA. Again, the results did not 
indicate that a relationship exists between cross-race face identification and a 
person's degree of Universal Orientation. It was expected that degree of Universal 
Orientation would relate to other-race face recognition because individuals who were 
high in Universal Orientation would have more interracial contact or would be neutral 
to the "race" aspect of a face when encoding facial information. However, a null 
relationship between face recognition and Universal Orientation suggests that one of 
two explanations is feasible within the confines of the contact hypothesis and the 
feature selection hypothesis. 
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First, Universal Orientation does not determine an individual's amount of 
contact with members of another race or attention to specific features of visual 
stimuli. Second, Universal Orientation is not a neutral construct as it was said to be 
by Phillips and Ziller (1997) and actually leads to "favoring" outgroups, allowing 
"race" to be a very salient feature when encoding information about others (which, 
according to the feature selection hypothesis, could cause superior memory for same-
race faces). The second explanation is supported by the positive correlation between 
the UOS and phase four preference scores. To clarify, because individuals who score 
high on the UOS do not look for "differences" between people they should not 
display a more positive attitude towards one group than another (Phillips & Ziller). 
Hypothesis three was tested by correlating the ATB scores with the difference 
scores from the face recognition task. No relationship was found between explicit 
attitudes expressed on the ATB and the difference scores. There was also little 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between explicit racial attitudes and cross-race 
face recognition. This finding has been a common one and is therefore not 
surprising; in fact, it confirms our third hypothesis. 
Taking the evidence from the tests of the three hypotheses, three conclusions 
can be drawn: (a) Implicit racial attitudes do relate to cross-race face recognition, (b) 
Universal Orientation does not relate to cross-race face recognition, and (c) Explicit 
racial attitudes do not relate to cross-race face recognition. It should be stated here 
that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to build a model of "how" racial attitudes 
play into the "other-race" effect. It is also important to state here that every result 
found in this study should be replicated to confirm the finding that racial attitudes 
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play a role in the "other-race" effect. The majority of the research on the topic of the 
"other-race" effect has shown that attitudes do not play a role in cross-race face 
recognition; therefore, the pattern of results reported in this paper should be replicated 
to ensure that they are reliable. 
The current study should be evaluated in the context of two important 
considerations. First, were the faces used in the priming procedure good stimuli? 
Second, why did our measure of contact not correlate with any of the recognition 
measures as they did in Brigham's studies? (Slone et al., 2000). 
To address the first consideration, it is possible that all of the priming effects 
were attenuated due to the fact that every face used as a prime showed positive affect. 
Although a good range of responding was found for both of the priming tasks, 
suggesting that the priming effect did occur, the range of responding in phase four in 
the current sample was less than that of Fazio et al. (1995). This concern could be 
addressed in future studies by using faces that are neutral in affect. However, mean 
scores for all of the positive adjectives indicate that responses to positive adjectives 
following each face were inhibited, not facilitated. This result suggests that the faces 
were not seen as "positive" due to their facial expression. Therefore, the positive 
affect displayed by the faces may not be an issue of great concern. Fazio et al. (1995) 
did not report the facial expression of their primes. Another concern about the primes 
is that the faces were not rated on attributes such as attractiveness and likability. 
Although the selection of the stimuli was carefully done to control for these attributes, 
independent ratings of the face stimuli should be collected before future research is 
conducted. 
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As regards the second consideration, it is possible that in our sample current 
level of interracial contact was not as strong a factor in memory for other-race faces 
as was anticipated. Although Slone et al. (2000) did find a significant relationship 
between current level of interracial contact and the "other-race" effect, the 
inconsistency of findings in experiments concerning the contact hypothesis make this 
difference unsurprising. It is very possible that for some individuals (or in some 
regions of the country) current interracial contact does lead to an improvement in 
ability to remember other-race faces while in other individuals (or regions) factors 
such as attitudes or past experience are more relevant. Because the ICQ was 
developed directly from the "current contacts" factor of Brigham's SEQ (1993) it is 
unlikely that any differences between the questionnaires could account for the 
differences between the present study and Slone et al. 
Future research addressing the role that racial attitudes play in the "other-
race" effect should include: (a) replications of the current findings using new faces in 
the priming procedures, (b) replications of the current findings using samples with 
different backgrounds, (c) repeating the current study using both African American 
and White participants, (d) further investigation into the differences between the 
phase four and phase five priming procedures, and (e) investigating the specific role 
that racial attitudes may play in the feature-selection and contact hypotheses. 
In conclusion it can be said that when using an approach different from that 
taken by past researchers, racial attitudes have been linked to the "other-race" effect. 
Seeleman (1940), who first linked racial attitudes to cross-racial face recognition, was 
successful in demonstrating that racial attitudes influence an individual's ability to 
remember faces of another race. However, the straightforward approach taken by 
Seeleman may have worked because people's expressed, deliberate attitudes and their 
implicit attitudes may have been exactly the same in 1940. Sixty-two years later, an 
individual's racial attitudes are not simple and what they deliberately think and how 
they implicitly react may be two very different things, both affecting the encoding of 
information (even visual information) in very different ways. 
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Universal Orientation Scale 
Below are a number of statements. Please indicate the degree to which you 
feel each item describes you on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Does not describe me well Describes me very well 
1) The similarities between males and females are greater than the differences. 
2) I tend to value similarities over differences when I meet someone. 
3) At one level of thinking we are all of a kind. 
4) I can understand almost anyone because I'm a little like everyone. 
5) Little differences among people mean a lot. 
6) I can see myself fitting in to many groups. 
7) There is a potential for good and evil in all of us. 
8) When I look into the eyes of others I see myself. 
9) I could never get accustomed to living in another country. 
10) When I first meet someone I tend to notice differences between myself and the other person. 
11) "Between" describes my position with regard to groups better than does "in" and "out". 
12) The same spirit dwells in everyone. 
13) Older persons are very different than 1 am. 
14) I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing their gender. 
15) There is a certain beauty in everyone. 
16) I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing his/her age. 
17) Men and women will never totally understand each other because of their inborn differences. 
18) Everyone in the world is very much alike because in the end we all die. 
19) I have difficulty relating to persons who are much younger than I am. 
20) When I meet someone I tend to notice the similarities between myself and the other person. 
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and 
traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains 
to you personally. 
1) Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 
2) I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
3) It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
4) I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
5) On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
6) I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
7) I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8) My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 
9) If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would 
probably do it. 
10) On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little 
of my ability. 
11)1 like to gossip at times. 
12) There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even 
though I knew they were right. 
13) No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
14) I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. 
15) There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
16) I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
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17) I always try to practice what I preach. 
18) I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious 
people. 
19) I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. 
20) When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. 
21) I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
22) At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 
23) There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
24) I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. 
25) I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
26) I have never been irritated when people expressed ideas very different from my 
own. 
27) I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 
28) There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
29) I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
30) I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. 
31)1 have never felt that I was punished without cause. 
32) I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they 
deserved. 
33) I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
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Interracial Contact Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is designed to assess the amount of interpersonal interaction you 
have on a regular basis. 
For the following items, please indicate your best estimate of the appropriate numeric value. 
All of these questions require that you reflect upon the people that you know and come in 
contact with on a regular basis. It might be helpful for you to stop and think about your 
"average day " before answering some of these questions. Try to think of where you go on a 
typical day, who you would normally see, and how much you interact with others. It is 
important to remember that your answers to these questions should be numbers and that 
these numbers are your best estimate of the number that, represents the answer to each 
question. 
1) On an average day, I talk to African American people on campus. 
2) In an average day, I spend hours of my social time with African American people. 
3) I could list and visually identify at least African American people that I know through the media (sports, 
movies, etc.) 
4) Currently, I have African American friends. 
5) On an average day, I have opportunities to talk to an African American person. 
6) On an average day, I talk to people on campus. 
7) On an average day at home or in my dorm I talk to African American people. 
8) I know African American people on a mutual first-name basis. 
9) During an average trip to a store I talk to African American people. 
10) On an average day at work I talk to people. 
11) Currently, I have friends. 
12) Within the last two months I have confided in African American people. 
13) Within the last two months I have confided in people. 
14) On an average day at home or in my dorm I talk to people. 
15) On an average day at work I talk to African American people. 
16) During an average trip to the store I talk to people. 
17) Within the last 2 years I have dated African American people. 





Years in College: 
Sex (Circle One): Male Female 
Race (check all that apply): Native American / Alaskan Native 
Asian / Asian American 
African / African American 
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander 
Caucasian 
How would you describe your home town? 
Farm Community 
Small Rural Town (less than 50,000 people) 
Suburban 
Small City (50,000 to 200,000 people) 
Large City (more than 200,000 people) 
How would you describe the place where you have lived for the past five years? 
(Do not include Bowling Green, unless you remain here over the summer break) 
Farm Community 
Small Rural Town (less than 50,000 people) 
Suburban 
Small City (50,000 to 200,000 people) 
Large City (more than 200,000 people) 
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Attitudes Towards Blacks Scale 
Please rate on a scale of 1-7 the degree to which you agree or disagree with 
the statements below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
1) If an African American were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice 
and direction from him or her. (1-7) 
2) If I had a chance to introduce African American visitors to my friends and 
neighbors, I would be pleased to do so. (1-7) 
3) I would rather not have African Americans live in the same apartment building I 
live in. (1-7) 
4) I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with an African American 
in a public place. (1-7) 
5) I would not mind it at all if an African American family with about the same 
income and education as me moved in next door. (1-7) 
6) I think that African American people look more similar to each other than White 
people do. (1-7) 
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1 2 3 4 5™ -6 7 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
7) Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the "who-am-I" confusion 
which the children feel. (1-7) 
8) I get very upset when I hear a White make a prejudiced remark about African 
Americans. (1-7) 
9) I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. 
(1-7) 
10) It would not bother me if my new roommate was African American. (1-7) 
11) It is likely that African Americans will bring violence to neighborhoods when 
they move in. (1-7) 
12) I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. (1-7) 
13) The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices 
African Americans suffer at the hands of local authorities. (1-7) 
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1 2 3 4 5™ -6 7 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
14) African American and White people are inherently equal. (1-7) 
15) African American people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal 
rights. (1-7) 
16) Whites should support African Americans in their struggle against discrimination 
and segregation. (1-7) 
17) Generally, African Americans are not as smart as Whites. (1-7) 
18) I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a 
promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. 
(1-7) 
19) Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both 
Whites and African Americans. (1-7) 
20) Some African Americans are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along 
with them. (1-7) 
122 
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Questionnaire 
Please rate on a scale of 1-7 the degree to which you agree or disagree with the 
statements below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree 
1) In today's society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any 
manner. (1-7) 
2) I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they 
might be. (1-7) 
3) I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered 
prejudiced. (1-7) 
4) If I were participating in a class discussion and an African American student 
expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own 
viewpoint. 
(1-7) 
5) Going through life worrying about whether you might offend someone is just more 
trouble than it's worth. (1-7) 
6) It's important to me that other people not think I'm prejudiced. (1-7) 
1 2 3 4 5™ 




7) I feel it's important to behave according to society's standards. (1-7) 
8) I'm careful not to offend my friends, but I don't worry about offending people I 
don't know or like. (1-7) 
9) I think that it is important to speak one's mind rather than to worry about offending 
someone. (1-7) 
10) It's never acceptable to express one's prejudices. (1-7) 
11)1 feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about an African American 
person. (1-7) 
12) When speaking to a African American person, it's important to me that he / she 
not think I'm prejudiced. (1-7) 
13) It bothers me a great deal when I think I've offended someone, so I'm always 
careful to consider other people's feelings. (1-7) 
1 2 3 4 5™ 




14) If I have a prejudiced thought or feeling, I keep it to myself. (1-7) 
15) I would never tell jokes that might offend others. (1-7) 
16) I'm not afraid to tell others what I think, even when I know they disagree with 
me. (1-7) 
17) If someone who made me uncomfortable sat next to me on a bus, I would not 
hesitate to move to another seat. (1-7) 
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Target Words in Phase Four, Faces Used as Primes in Each Trial within each Block 
of Trials 
Target W o r d Faces Block 1 B 2 B3 B 4 
Appealing AAF1. WF1 ASM 1, WM7 AAM1, WM1 ASF1, WF7 
Attractive AAF2, WF2 ASM2. WM8 AAM2, WM2 ASF2, WF8 
Charming AAF3, WF3 ASM3. WM9 AAM3, WM3 ASF3, WF9 
Delightful AAF4, WF4 ASM4. WM10 AAM4. WM4 ASF4.WF10 
Desirable ASM1, WM7 AAF1, WF1 ASF1. WF7 AAM1.WM1 
Fabulous ASM2. WM8 AAF2. WF2 ASF2. WF8 AAM2.WM2 
Favorable ASM3, WM9 AAF3, WF3 ASF3, WF9 AAM3.WM3 
Likable ASM4, WM10 AAF4, WF4 ASF4. WF10 AAM4.WM4 
Nice AAF5. WF5 ASM5, WM11 AAM5, WM5 ASF5, WF11 
Pleasant ASM5. WM11 AAF5. WF5 ASF5, WF11 AAM5.WM5 
Superior AAF6, WF6 ASM6, WM12 AAM6. WM6 ASF6.WF12 
Wonderful ASM6, WM12 AAF6, WF6 ASF6, WF12 AAM6.WM6 
Annovina AAM1, WM1 ASF1, WF7 ASM 1, WM7 AAF1, WF1 
Awful ASF1, WF7 AAM1, WM1 AAF1. WF1 ASM1,WM7 
Disturbing AAM2. WM2 ASF2, WF8 ASM2, WM8 AAF2.WF2 
Horrible ASF2, WF8 AAM2, WM2 AAF2. WF2 ASM2,WM8 
Inferior AAM3, WM3 ASF3, WF9 ASM3, WM9 AAF3.WF3 
Irritating ASF3. WF9 AAM3.WM3 AAF3.WF3 ASM3.WM9 
Nastv AAM4, WM4 ASF4. WF10 ASM4, WM10 AAF4.WF4 
Offensive ASF4, WF10 AAM4, WM4 AAF4. WF4 ASM4.WM10 
Repulsive AAM5. WM5 ASF5, WF11 ASM5, WM11 AAF5.WF5 
Rotten ASF5, WF11 AAM5. WM5 AAF5. WF5 ASM5.WM11 
Terrifying AAM6. WM6 ASF6, WF12 ASM6. WM12 AAF6.WF6 
Upsetting ASF6, WF12 AAM6, WM6 AAF6, WF6 ASM6.WM12 
AAF=African American Female, AAM= African American Male, WF= White Female, WM=White Male, ASF= 
Asian Female, ASM= Asian Male 
